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chips fall where they may and noting that neither the Republicans 
nor the Democrats have as yet come to grips with the basic issues' 
of our time. 
Following in the footsteps of his father, the late Paul M. Warburg, 
who warned in March, 1929, that an earlier boom would end in a 
major depression, James P. Warburg now bluntly declares that 
"we are sleepwalking into preventable disaster." But, having 
sounded this note of alarm, the author shows how he believes that 
the dangers he foresees can be avoided. 
"The future", says James Warburg, "is hard and grim but also 
full of promise. It is desperate only if we continue to misread the 
present and thus miss the opportunities that lie before us." 
DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY strikes hard at the prevailing 
mood of complacency and at what the author calls "the bipartisan 
conspiracy of silence." 
A pamphlet that will bring deeply concerned citizens not comfort, 
but hope and guidance toward its realization. 
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Foreword 
SLEEP-WALKING INTO DISASTER. 
This is a sequel to a pamphlet, entitled Turning Point Toward 
Peace, written in the summer of 1955 shortly after the "Summit 
Meeting" at Geneva. The purpose of that pamphlet was to arouse 
American awareness of the dangers and opportunities presented 
by a changed and rapidly changing world and to bring the basic 
issues of American foreign policy into the forefront of discussion 
in an election year. 
During the past twelve months, the dangers have multiplied 
while the opportunities have diminished. The Genevi meeting 
still appears in retrospect as a probable turning point toward peace, 
but peace now threatens to mean for Western civilization some- 
thing only a little less catastrophic than a war of extinction; namely, 
defeat without war. 
It is now often said that Geneva accomplished nothing. This 
is true only in the sense that no outstanding differences were there 
resolved. But, while the Big Four meeting may not have accom- 
plished anything, it changed everything. It marked the end of 
one era in which physical force had been the essential instrument 
of national policy and the beginning of a new era in which national 
aims would have to be pursued by persuasion rather than by power. 
The communist leaders have been quicker to grasp the 
significance of this change than the Western statesmen. Therein 
lies the mounting danger. 
For the past twelve months, American foreign policy has 
stagnated. Up to the time of the nominating conventions of 
August, 1956, there has been no serious discussion of the basic 
issues. In the face of the rapidly accumulating evidence of the 
bankruptcy of its foreign policy, a Republican administration has 
boasted of imaginary triumphs and successes, standing pat upon 
obsolete concepts inherited from its Democratic predecessor. The 
Democratic opposition has been tongue-tied and brain-paralyzed 
by the knowledge that this bankrupt policy was initiated by a 
Democratic President, forgetting that in the meanwhile the world 
had undergone a radical change. 
- w As the result of bipartisan avoidance of basic issues, t h e  
opportunities for public education offered by an election year-have 
been largely wasted. 
In =nominating Adlai E. Stevenson for the Presidency, the 
Democratic party has- chosen the leader best qualified to break 
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through the sound-barrier of bipartisan silence. Moreover, former 
President Truman's savage but futile attempt to block Governor 
Stevenson's nomination should at last have removed the incubus 
which has blocked Democratic thinking. Whatever may have 
been the merits or defects of Truman's foreign policy, the Demo- 
cratic candidate is no longer under any obligation to defend it. 
There can be no doubt that Adlai Stevenson will tell the 
American people the unvarnished truth as he sees it. But the 
truth, without a clearly defined alternative to the present disastrous 
3 policy, will not suflice. 
The Democratic foreign policy plank, adopted at Chicago, 
provided no such alternative. It was a hodge-podge of pronounce- 
ments and promises designed to appeal to various groups of voters, 
rather than a statement of foreign policy. (The Republican plank, 
adopted at San Francisco, denied the need for any alternative; in 
the words of the staunchly Republican but disappointed New 
York Herald Tribune, it "concentrated on past successes and on 
a complacent analysis of present trends.") The Democratic plat- 
form committed its candidates, if elected, to continued support of 
Nationalist China, opposition t'o admitting the Peking regime to 
the United Nations and the sending of arms to Israel-three courses 
of action which might well be inappropriate by the time a new 
administration would take office. Governor Stevenson accepted 
the platform without reservation. 
In his acceptance speech, Governor Stevenson spoke elo- 
quently of the need for restoring American prestige and leader- 
ship but gave no indication of the measures by which this end was 
to be attained. If he had in mind any alternative to the policy 
which he criticized, it was already late in the day to bring it 
forward. The final stages of a Presidential campaign do not 
readily lend themselves to the kind of calm, careful elucidation 
required to bring about a basic re-orientation of public opinion. 
This pamphlet is not intended as a campaign document. It 
is written by a Democrat in the rueful belief that the campaign will 
be fought chiefly over issues almost wholly irrelevant to the basic 
problems confronting this nation and that, whatever the outcome 
of the November elections, these problems will remain to be solved. 
What we need is not merely a new approach to foreign policy. 
Our failures in the foreign field have deep roots here at home. If 
our foreign policy conveys the impression that what Americans 
desire most is to have a world in revolution stand still, it is chiefly 
because we are more concerned here at home with preserving 
what we have-or think we have-than with progress. 
The world is not going to stand still. Nor can we survive in 
it as a status quo power. Adlai Stevenson understands this and 
recognizes that, as he put it, we must "get off dead center." But, 
while it is true that we cannot regain a position of dynamic influence 
abroad until we resume forward progress at home, the reverse is 
also true. We cannot resume forward progress at home so long 
as we remain tied to a half-frightened and half-belligerent status 
quo policy abroad. 
The greatest obstacle to be overcome by any leader who 
attempts at this late hour to show the American people the way 
out of their grave predicament is the state of mind which has 
been induced by smug self-righteousness and Pollyanna propaganda. 
We are literally sleep-walking into preventable disaster. 
We are living in a dream world in which we alternate between 
fond fantasies and nightmares of horror. On the one hand, we 
confidently assure ourselves and each other that there will be no 
war; that, if there is a war, The Bomb will never be used; and 
that, somehow, life will be safer, easier and more pleasant 
tomorrow than it is today. On the other hand, we shake with fear 
at the approaching end of the world; and in this mood, we either 
sink into hopeless and helpless apathy or decide to "eat, drink 
and be merry, for tomorrow we die." 
The future is neither as rosy nor as hopeless as we see it in 
our alternating fantasies. The future is hard and grim but also 
full of promise. It is desperate only if we continue to misread 
the present and thus miss the opportunities which lie before us. 
If you are deeply concerned, as I am, for the future of your 
children and grandchildren, for the future of your country and 
the future of the human race, you may £ind in these pages not com- 
fort but hope, and perhaps something in the way of guidance 




THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA OF THE UNITED STATES. 
About two months before the collision of the Stockholm and 
the Andrea Doria off Nantucket, I saw a film which reproduced 
the tragic night of April 15, 1912, when the White Star liner 
Titanic, then on her maiden voyage to New York, struck an iceberg 
while going at full speed, ripped out her port side and went to the 
bottom of the Atlantic, carrying down with her 1,513 of her 2,224 
passengers and crew. 
The captain had received repeated warnings of ice ahead but 
had failed to reduce speed. After all, his ship, like the ill-fated 
Andrea Doria 44 years later, was considered unsinkable because 
of its then novel system of bulkheads and watertight compartments. 
As the great vessel sailed to her doom, many of the passengers had 
retired for the night. Others were still celebrating the successful 
voyage, drinking champagne and dancing to the strains of the ship's 
orchestra. Among the passengers was the Titanic's designer who 
had been so certain of the ship's unsinkability that he had provided 
only about half the lifeboats needed for a full complement. 
Watching this film I was obsessed by a terrible thought. It 
was that we, the people of the United States, are similarly sailing 
through the night toward disaster. . . . 
Unlike the captain of the Titanic, our leaders have not disre- 
garded the warning of ice ahead but they have fallen into an 
equally dangerous error. They have seen only that tenth of the 
iceberg which floats above water and which appears as a threat 
of communist military aggression. They have prepared against 
this threat but have ignored the submerged nine-tenths of the 
menace which lies in our path. 
Ever since the atomic stalemate has produced the realization 
that "there is no alternative to peace", our leaders have begun to 
realize that a dictatorship which believes in the inevitability of its 
eventual triumph is not very likely to risk the unpredictable hazards 
of a major conflict. One by one, most of the Western statesmen 
have been forced to question whether the basic challenge to our 
civilization is not perhaps more political and economic than 
military. 
I. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DANGERS 
OUR ECONOMY IS NOT AN UNSINKABLE VESSEL 
Unfortunately, when it comes to facing an economic challenge, 
American leaders, like the officers of the Titanic, believe them- 
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selves to be in command of an unsinkable vessel. American 
supremacy .in economic development and technological advance is 
taken as much for granted in Washington as eventual communist 
world domination is taken for granted in Moscow. 
This complacent assumption of unchallengable American eco- 
nomic supremacy constitutes one of our great dangers. I venture 
to make this statement for two reasons: 
First, because I believe that the American economy is by no 
means as strong or as healthy as our leaders appear to think; and 
Second, because available statistics indicate that, at the pres- 
ent rates of growth, the Soviet Union may, within the next fifteen 
or twenty years, supplant the United States as the chief supplier 
of the world's requirements of producer's goods. 
These two assertions, if valid, foreshadow the worst disaster 
in our history, unless we make rapid radical changes in both our 
domestic and our foreign policy. 
It is an ungrateful task to predict catastrophe, especially in a 
time of widespread complacency like the present. I well remember 
some of the angry letters which my father, Paul M. Warburg, 
received when he warned, in March 1929, that our then booming 
economy was headed for a crash.* I am certain that, were my 
father alive today, he would once more consider it a public duty 
to sound the alarm, all the more so as in the present crisis the 
means are at hand by which disaster can be averted. This was not 
true in 1929. 
In 1929, we faced the collapse of a speculative boom involv- 
ing, in the first instance, the securities markets and the banking 
system. Ultimately, the collapse carried with it not only the whole 
of our national economy but the economies of many other nations, 
paralyzing world trade and creating many of the preconditions for 
World War 11. The then existing means for arresting the boom 
and for controlling excessive speculation were inadequate, even if 
there had been any inclination on the part of the Hoover adminis- 
tration to use them. The willingness to act, to undertake measures 
* 'The late Paul M. Warburg, head of the Bank of the Manhattan Com- 
pany, was the only important banker who publicly warned against the 
, impending collapse . . ." Elliott V. Bell in We Saw I t  Happen, Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 1939, page 142. 
"Paul Warburg, a great financial authority and a great man who had given 
years of his life to the original building up of the Federal Reserve System, 
issued early in 1929 public warning that speculation had gone wild and that 
the country would have to pay for it . . ." Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
Looking Forward, John Day Co., Inc., 1933, page 219. 
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of reform and to forge new instruments of public power had first 
to be created by the ordeal of the Great Depression. 
Today, the means exist by which an even greater catastrophe 
than that of 1929 can be prevented, but as yet there is no sign 
that the imminent danger is recognized or that measures are in 
contemplation to meet it. 
Since 1929, the focus of our economic infection has shifted 
from Wall Street to Madison Avenue and to both ends of Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue in our nation's capital. The two great unrecognized 
sore spots in our domestic economy are: (1) the reckless over- 
stimulation of consumer demand coupled with the even more 
reckless overexpansion of consumer credit; and (2) the depend- 
- ence of our "prosperity" upon the continuation of vast military 
expenditures. The first evil is the product of manufacturers, dis- 
tributors and lending institutions which have become dependent 
upon the great advertising agencies. The second evil is the 
product of a bipartisan political leadership obsessed with obsolete 
concepts of strategy and power politics. 
In 1929, when the whole country was seized by a get-rich- 
quick speculative mania, American consumers borrowed about 
$27.5 billions, or about one-third of their income after taxes. 
(Consumer income in 1929 was $83 billions.) Of this consumer 
borrowing, about $21 billions consisted of mortgages on 1-4 
famiIy non-farrn homes.* 
In 1 955, American consumers borrowed $1 24.6 billions 
against a disposable income of over $270 billions-a percentage of 
46% as against 33% in 1929. Of this borrowing, $88.4 billions 
was on home mortgages; $36.2 billions represented various forms 
of consumer debt. * * In 1955, it could no longer be assumed that 
home mortgages necessarily financed constructive expenditure in 
buying, building or modernizing family homes. According to 
Fortune Magazine, the proceeds of $5.5 billions of new mortgages 
placed upon American homes in 1955 were spent on automobiles, 
television sets, vacation travel and other luxury or semi-luxury 
items. 
* Historical Statistics of the United States, page 174. .- 
** January 1956 Economic Report of the President; July 1956 Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 
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Why were American consumers borrowing so heavily in 1955? 
They were not to any appreciable extent speculating in the stock 
market. Why did they find it necessary to borrow and spend 
146% of their earnings? 
Some of the debt was incurred for constructive purposes, such 
as home-building and education, or to finance income-producing 
improvements or investments. There can be no doubt, however, 
that a large part of this huge consumer debt was incurred by 
people who bought gadgets and luxury items which they could not 
afford, mainly because of sales pressure, social pressure to arrive 
at or maintain a certain status, and easy terms of credit. It was 
the old story of "champagne taste and beer pocketbook", except 
that the champagne taste was now deliberately created by massive 
appeal to acquisitiveness, irresponsibility and social snobbery. 
It should be emphasized that the evil under discussion is 
primarily a middle class evil. The lower income groups borrow 
for the most part in order to acquire necessities, but they, too, are 
under constant pressure to live beyond their incomes. Moreover, 
in the fluid American society, the middle class sets the pattern. 
Granted that even frivolous consumption is less injurious to 
the nation's economy than hare-brained speculation, the fact 
remains that there is a danger to economic stability whenever 
a large part of the population over-reaches itself in expenditure, 
no matter for what purpose. There is also a danger to the morale 
of a people habituated to relying upon luck or government subsidy 
to take care of the proverbial rainy day. 
It is often overlooked that when the consumer mortgages his 
future buying power, the producer mortgages his future sales. 
In such circumstances any "corrective recession" is likely to turn 
into a major downward spiral, especially when, as is now the 
case, one whole sector of the national economy is already suffering 
from a prolonged depression. 
Now, as in the 1920's, we have the warning of continuing 
distress and reduced purchasing power in the farm belt. The 
problem posed by falling farm prices and mounting agricultural 
surpluses was by no means solved by the legislation passed in 
1956 by the 84th Congress, even though the incidence of a drought 
in some of the farm states made the soil bank payments authorized 
by this legislation effective as a temporary prop to drought-stricken 
farmers. The question is not one of fixed or flexible price sup- 
ports; it is one of devising a radically altered approach to the 
farmer's dilemma-an approach based upon adjusting crop pro- 
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duction to world dematld and of increasing consumption rather 
than supporting prices beyond the reach of potential consumers.* 
Distress in the farm belt has already affected factory employ- 
ment. Some labor leaders have taken alarm, but labor's action, 
on the whole, has been confined to securing additional wage 
increases while the getting is still good, thus raising costs and 
prices still further. Businessmen are paying but scant attention 
to the danger signals, proceeding to enlarge their plants in the 
belief that we face, at worst, a minor set-back, after which the 
demands of a rising population will be greater than ever. This is 
not because American businessmen are stupid or reckless. It is 
because they are assuming the permanence of a safeguard against 
a major depression-the continuance of something like 35 billion 
dollars a year of government expenditurewhich may not be as 
permanent as they think. At a time when the future of every 
business is threatened by an ever more dangerous arms race, 
American businessmen are taking its continuance for granted. 
Let me summarize the domestic economic picture as I see it. 
1. Our prosperity is not a "peace prosperity". It is a 
precarious preparedness prosperity which will end abruptly if and 
when the world comes to its senses and military expenditures are 
sharply curtailed, unless government expenditures for other than 
military purposes promptly take up the slack. Because we are not 
preparing now for any such program of peace-time expenditure, 
we are building up a dangerous vested interest in not making peace. 
2. Our present high level of production and consumption is 
based upon an unhealthy mortgaging of the future. In the absence 
of preventive action taken very soon, this condition may before 
long result in a downturn which is likely to go much further than 
our political and economic leaders seem to anticipate. Such a 
setback may well be sharp enough to cause serious unemploy- 
ment, to re-stimulate racial discrimination, to unbalance the 
precariously balanced economies of some of our allies and, worst 
of all, to create additional pressures against ending the arms race. 
* The need for a new consumer-oriented approach to the American farm 
problem was discussed in Turning Point Toward Peace, Chapter 4. 
These two factors of internal economic weakness combine 
not only to threaten our own prosperity but to jeopardize American 
leadership toward world peace. 
The danger we face from these domestic sources is magnified 
by an external menace: Russia is beginning to beat us at our own 
best game. 
At the present rates of respective growth, it is estimated by 
careN analysts* that Soviet production will, in about five years, 
reach the American level of 1956 and that, in ten or fifteen years 
more, Russia will have surpassed the United States as the world's 
top industrial producer. 
That is not all. While a large part of our annual increase 
goes into satisfying the over-stimulated and over-financed demands 
of the American consumer, most of Russia's annual growth goes- 
at the expense of the Russian consumer for so long as he may 
stand for it-into increased production of such things as steel, 
machinery, tools and power-plant equipment, including atomic 
reactors-in other words, into precisely the sort of goods for 
which the economically retarded countries of the world are 
clamoring. 
Taken together, the more rapid growth of Soviet production 
and its concentration upon producer's goods rather than upon 
articles of consumption will rapidly make Russia the chief source 
of supply for world economic development. 
The political consequences of Soviet economic supremacy are 
self-evident. Given a continuation of openly hostile, cut-throat 
competition, they amount to communist victory without war. If 
we simply project existing trends into the future, Russia will, at 
some time during the next generation, control enough of the raw 
material sources and markets to make a shambles of Western 
prosperity. 
This truly terrifying development is by no means inevitable. 
If we wake up in time, we have the power to prevent it. Unfortu- 
nately, prevention requires a degree of foresight and courage on 
the part of American leadership which is not as yet in evidence. 
It also requires a considerable willingness to sacrifice on the part 
of the American people-a willingness which would, I am con- 
* A. Nove in the Lloyds Bank Review, April 1956. T. Balogh in The 
Nation, June 9, 1956. Hugh Massingham and Tom Whitney in The New' 
Republic, June 11, 1956. 
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DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 
vinced, exist if the people were told the truth about the existing 
dangers and if they were given bold, constructive leadership. 
Having played the part of Cassandra, let me now briefly 
indicate how this somber projection of present trends may be 
proved false-how we can strengthen our economy where it is 
weak, increase its rate of growth and re-channel a substantial 
part of our productive capacity into the service of world economic 
development. 
1. Irrespective of whether or not the arms race continues, 
we must reduce the dependence of our economy upon military 
expenditures. We must also stimulate its growth in order to 
prevent Russian hegemony. Both can be accomplished by a 
carefully planned program of public and private expenditure 
in developing our own "underdeveloped areas9'-by building much- 
needed schools, by clearing over-populated slums and building 
new housing, by improving transportation facilities, by flood 
control and river developments, and perhaps even by stimulating 
the growth of new, decentralized industrial centers. The statutory 
basis for such an effort already exists in the Employment Act of 
1946, which requires the President to take the initiative each year 
in presenting to Congress the levels of production and employ- 
ment needed for the nation's welfare along with recommendations 
for public and private action to achieve these gods. 
At present, we are inhibited by the misconception that any 
program of increased public expenditure would mean deficit finance 
and higher taxes. We are not only mesmerized by the fetish of a 
balanced budget but misled as to our capabilities within the 
limits of achieving a balanced budget. Because we are spending 
35 billions a year on unproductive armaments, we are led to 
believe that we cannot afford to make even the most necessary 
productive expenditures without either irresponsibly increasing the 
national debt or imposing additional taxes. Actually, wisely 
planned public expenditures combined with proper incentives to 
private investment would result only in a larger budget, not an 
unbalanced one; the increased rate of growth in our economy would 
produce greater revenues and eventually lower taxes. The accent 
here is upon "wisely planned public expenditures combined with 
proper incentives to private investment". Public spending alone 
will not do the job. It depends upon how and for what public 
money is spent. 
Thirteen 
2. In the face of the Soviet challenge, it is not enough to 
increase our rate of growth in order to keep ahead of the Soviet 
Union. It is also necessary to re-channel some of our increased 
production so that the United States, rather than the Soviet 
Union, will continue to be the chief source of aid to world 
economic development. Our great, long-range advantage over 
Russia is that we possess the skius and the resources to meet the 
economic requirements of a world in revolution without taking 
foreign aid out of the hide of the domestic consumer. We are 
capable of being the world's supplier without repressing the living 
standard of our own people. We can, however, do this only if 
we apply a certain amount of common sense and moral sense to 
our definition of a desirable living standard and if we place cer- 
tain restraints upon our "free enterprise capitalism". These two 
provisos are not easy to fulfill. 
Part of what we must do in this respect can be accomplished 
through government action but most of it depends upon us as 
individual citizens. 
I suspect that most Americans already know in their hearts 
that in recent years their pursuit of happiness has become far too 
much a pursuit of material possessions, many of which are not 
only unnecessary but actually of little or only ephemeral value. 
Most of us realize, I think, that we are talked into buying a lot 
of things that we don't really need or want-things that we know r 
we cannot afford but purchase nevertheless because they are offered 
': 
to us on "easy terms of credit". Most of us are aware of the i 
fact that we are often persuaded to turn in a car or an appliance J: 
which is still perfectly serviceable merely in order to acquire "the 
latest model", because a flood of advertising and clever sales . 
talk have made us feel that it is somehow not quite respectable 
not to keep up with the procession. 
What most of us do not realize is that the price of the shiny 
new possessions we acquire is often considerably higher than it 
need be because of wasteful competition and inflated cost of adver- 
tising and distribution. For example : 
I (  
Out of every dollar the American housewife spends for food, 
56 cents go to middlemen and processors. Only 44 cents go to the 
farmer who actually produces the food we eat. A part of the 
processor's share of the food dollar is a legitimate charge for 
doing much of the work formerly done in the family kitchen. A 
part of the middleman's share of the food dollar is legitimately 
earned by the convenient facilities he provides for retail distribu- 
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tion. But a considerable part of the 56 cents we pay middlemen 
merely defrays the cost of unnecessary and wasteful competition 
between concerns selling almost identical products under different 
trade names, each spending millions of dollars in advertising the 
alleged superiority of its product. 
Much of the same thing is true of almost everything we buy, 
from automobiles to toothpaste. Can you tell one beer from another 
if you don't see the bottle or the can? Can your wife tell the 
difference between one lipstick and another if she doesn't see the 
packaging? Can either of you identlfy your favorite cigarette 
in the dark? 
"But," you will say, "this kind of advertising is what supports 
television. If it weren't for the beer and cigarette manufacturers, I 
couldn't watch baseball games. If it weren't for the cosmetics 
people, there would be no such shows as 'The $64,000 Question.' If 
it weren't for Mercury, there would be no Ed Sullivan on Sunday." 
Very true. And this brings us to one of the aspects of our 
social structure that seems to me worth thinking about. 
The theory of mass production is that it brings more goods to 
more people at lower prices, while at the same time yielding higher 
profits to the producers. The first Henry Ford's Tin Lizzie was 
the outstanding practical example. The theory holds good, how- 
ever, only if a steadily expanding market keeps pace with mass 
productive capacity. Prior to the Great Depression, whenever 
productive capacity outran effective demand-by which I mean 
desire to buy plus ability to pay-people were accustomed to 
speak of "cyclical overproduction." Lord Keynes, the great 
Enghsh economist, was the first to demonstrate that this phenome- 
non could be more accurately described as underconsumption, 
arising from underemployment and a maldistribution of income. 
When, under the impact of the Great Depression, the mass pro- 
ducers realized that they needed a more rapidly and more steadily 
expanding market than that provided by a laissez-faire economy, 
they became reconciled to a certain amount of government inter- 
vention in the interest of maintaining the full employment and 
stable purchasing power of a rising population. 
But even the New Deal reforms were not enough to enable 
mass purchasing power to keep pace with the growth of a more 
and more automatic mass production. 
For a time, the problem was concealed by the incidence of a 
war which created abnormal demands both during and immediately 
after the conflict. But, when the backed-up post-war consumer 
demand had finally been satisfied, industry was again faced with 
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the problem of how to create a more rapidly expanding market. 
In these circumstances, the mass producers resorted to two 
expedients, neither of them new but neither of which had been 
used before on a massive scale: the first was to stimulate the 
consumer's desire to buy by advertising; the second was to increase 
the consumer's abiliiy to buy by offering various forms of con- 
sumer credit. 
Neither of these two devices can permanently solve the 
problem of an increasingly mechanized economy. Either device, 
if abused, can do considerable harm. 
The expansion of consumer credit creates no new purchasing 
power; it merely makes future purchasing power available in the 
present. If credit is used wisely and for productive purposes, 
its availability can be beneficial, as, for instance, when a young 
man buys a house on mortgage credit instead of rearing his family 
in a crowded apartment or tenement. If, on the other hand, 
credit is used unwisely to acquire unnecessary luxuries or to 
pretend - to an economic status beyond the borrower's earning 
power, it can do great harm. No matter how consumer credit is 
used, the fact remains that its excessive expansion removes one 
of the chief safeguards against letting a normal recession turn 
into a deflationary spiral. 
Whether advertising is beneficial or harmful depends upon 
what sort of appetites it stimulates. In the American society, how- 
ever, advertising has assumed a disproportionate influence not 
only upon the consumer but upon the producer and upon almost 
every facet of American business and American life. 
Let us grant that there could be no mass market for con- 
sumer goods without national advertising and that there could be 
no national advertising without the mass media of communication. 
This might be expected to leave the mass media of communica- 
tion in the driver's seat; but such is not the case in the American 
society. The mass media of communication in our society live on 
advertising revenue, because we, the American people, prefer not 
to pay for more than a fraction of the cost of our information 
and entertainment. Since we want our daily newspaper for 5 cents 
or less, Life Magazine for 20 cents and television for nothing, 
the price we pay is that of having our information and entertain- 
ment suffocated in sales talk and, so far as entertainment i s  
concerned, dictated by the panjandrums of Madison Avenue. 
The result is that individual taste in the United States is being 
submerged by a mass "taste". artificially created by the specialists 
in sales promotion. Madison Avenue now determines how' 
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Americans shall live, eat, clothe and amuse themselves. The 
people who dream up slogans and displays, who write radio soap- 
opera and television shows, who "package" entertainment and 
streamline even the words addressed to us by the President, have 
not only become the arbiters of American business but of the 
present American "way of life". 
I am not suggesting that we attempt to make any drastic 
changes in this rather'strange order, but I am suggesting that we 
apply a little more common sense; that we, as individuals, develop 
a little more sales resistance; and that we support certain govern- 
ment action to curb some of the abuses of our free enterprise 
system. 
There are a variety of actions our government could take to 
bring more necessities within reach of the consumer's income and 
to limit or discourage the excessive production of nonessential 
luxuries. Government could, for example, investigate and, if 
warranted, prosecute under the anti-trust laws some of the giant 
corporations open to suspicion of monopolistic practices. This 
might result in a considerable reduction of food and other prices. 
The tax laws could be revised in such a manner as to eliminate 
the tax deductibility of questionable business expenditures, such as 
elaborate entertainment, "institutional advertising" and other items 
presently encouraged by the fact that "Uncle Sam pays for it any- 
way". A mild version of wartime allocation of basic materials 
could be devised so as to discourage the production of luxury 
items, particularly where substantially the same product is mar- 
keted and heavily advertised under competing trade names. 
Another field for desirable action by our public and private 
agencies is that of providing better insurance against the vicis- 
situdes which, through no fault of their own befall the very young, 
the very old and those who are stricken by disease or accident. 
Inevitable shifts in employment due to new automatic processes, 
new materials and increasing foreign competition (as, for example, 
in textiles) demand more effective cushions than we now provide 
against displacement and readjustment. The United States lags 
far behind other developed countries in providing adequate health 
insurance. It lags dangerously far behind the Soviet Union in 
providing full educational facilities. 
There is no contradiction, as I see it, between urging greater 
thrift and less frivolous consumption on the one hand, and 
increased social services on the other. The people need greater 
protection than they now enjoy against developments over which 
they have no control. They need to exercise more restraint and 
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more common sense in bdancing those factors of income and 
expenditure which they do control. 
In the presently prevaiting mood of complacency, government 
action such as that here suggested is not likely to be popular. Yet 
such action will not be undertaken and, if undertaken, will not be 
effective, unless it enjoys wide public support. I am convinced 
that public support would be forthcoming, if the American people 
were given a chance to understand the truth about their present 
perilous position. 
Must it take a war or a depression to bring out the best that is 
in us? Are we incapable of acting wisely in our own interest to 
anticipate and prevent a catastrophe before it is too late? 
Fortunately, what we must do in the interest of our own 
domestic health and stability will almost automatically set us on 
the right path toward rendering effective assistance abroad. Once 
we free our national policy from outworn bookkeeping concepts 
of penny-wisdom and pound foolishness, resume our forward 
progress and develop our great potential, we shall be able to 
approach the problem of world economic development in a wholly 
different light. We shall then find that, without inflicting any 
hardship upon ourselves, we can serve world progress far better 
than the Russians or any other nation. 
We shall then address ourselves to making the tools, the 
maCbes, the power-plant equipment and the atomic reactors that 
other people need and want. We shall grow the crops needed to 
raise the nutrition level of the undernourished peoples, instead of 
merely trying to supply them with the surplus of what we make or 
grow for ourselves. 
The next problem will then be to develop methods of enabling 
other countries to acquire what we are able to produce for them. 
Part of our publicly and privately planned domestic development 
must be to create markets in this country for the surplus products 
of other countries, particularly the underdeveloped nations. Why 
should not we, instead of the Russians, be able to take Ceylonese 
rubber in exchange for tools and machinery? Why should we go 
on producing a surplus cotton crop which overhangs the world 
market, leaving it to the Soviet bloc to barter manufactured goods 
for Egypt's cotton? 
Trade cannot, of course, supplant aid entirely. Many of the 
crucially important countries, like India, wiU require long-term 
loans and investments of foreign capital. The revamping of our 
economy must provide not only for liberalizing our own import 
restrictions but for a deliberate program of long-term investment 
abroad. The more of this investment can be channeled through 
the 'United Nations, the better. The more we challenge Russia to 
direct its foreign aid through the United Nations to match our 
contribution, the more we shall reduce Russian ability to gain 
political influence through bilateral economic assistance. 
In my last book, referred to in the introduction,* I presented 
a detailed study of our foreign trade and foreign lending and 
investment policies. The revision of these policies which seemed 
urgent in 1955 has become even more urgent today. 
I did not say then and I do not say now that we must revise 
our policies merely in order to meet the communist economic 
offensive. What I do say is that while the communists have 
created no new imperatives, they have shortened the time in which 
we must do what our own enlightened self-interest has long 
demanded. Had there been no communist dictatorships, it is pos- 
sible that the revolt of the underprivileged two-thirds of humanity 
might have been postponed for another generation. What the 
communists have done is to force us to face here and now the 
fact that the time is past when the white peoples of the Atlantic 
Community can hope to live in freedom, comfort and security 
while the rest of the world exists in various degrees of misery. 
The communists have moved up the deadline for a decision which 
had already become inescapable. 
Before that deadline is reached, we shall have to win the 
confidence and friendship of the peoples who are emerging into 
freedom and seeking a fair share of the world's productivity, or 
else our civilization will perish. Before the time left to us expires, 
we shall have to move into the vanguard of the existing world 
revolution or else be overrun by it. 
This is by no means solely an economic problem. Its most 
important aspects may well be the liquidation of colonialism and 
of the notion of "white supremacy" but the economic aspect is 
what we are discussing here. I shall limit myself to repeating a 
few of the concrete suggestions previously put forward: 
1 .  Let us rid ourselves of the notion that we cannot afford 
to contribute generously to world economic development until 
savings can be realized from a reduction of armaments. Let us 
recognize instead that we cannot afjord NOT to make that contri- 
bution now, irrespective of what we spend on armaments. 
* Op. cit. Turning Point Toward Peace. Chapters 5 and 6. 
This is a point which this writer has repeatedly emphasized, 
ever since 1950, when the late Senator Brien MacMahon of 
Connecticut introduced a resolution pledging American savings 
from arms reduction to world economic development. A similar 
pledge was given by President Eisenhower in 1953. As previously 
pointed out, "This is a noble promise, but starving people cannot 
eat promises". 
We are not taking here about any fantastic figures. The 
highest estimate of what it would take to raise incomes in the 
underdeveloped areas by 2% each year is about 10 billion dollars. 
Other more conservative analyses indicate that 2% to 3 billion 
dollars per annum is the maximum of foreign capital that could 
profitably be put to work in the underdeveloped areas.* Even 
if the United States were to assume all of this annual burden, 
which it would certainly not do, its contribution would be con- 
siderably less than the American people spend annually on cos- 
metics. 
2. Let us rid ourselves of the notion that the capital needs of 
me underdeveloped areas can be supplied by  self-liquidating bank 
loans and private equity investment.** 
Neither bank loans nor private investment can supply the 
funds needed for malaria and pest control, for harbor and trans- 
portation development, or for the building of schools and hospitals. 
World Bank and Export-Import Bank loans can be made only 
within the limits of strict charter requirements, though the new 
International Finance Corporation will be able, so far as its limited 
* Chairman J. D. Zellerbach of the non-partisan Committee for Economic 
Development recently summarized a careful staff study as follows: 
"Conservative estimates suggest that the independent underdeveloped eoun- 
tries should be able to use effectively between $1 billion and $1.5 billion of 
new foreign capital each year during the next few years, over and above the $1.1 they are now receiving". It should be noted that this figure does not 
include colonial possessions. The committee's figure of $1.1 new capital 
presently flowing into the independent underdeveloped areas comprises $400 
million in U. S. economic assistance, $170 million in World Bank and 
Export-Import Bank loans, $50 million in European loans and $500 million 
in private investment. The latter figure is, of come, mostly oil company 
investment. 
** This, too, is a fallacy which the writer has been at pains to expose ever 
since the controversy, in 1949, between the supporters of President Truman's 
original "Point Four" Program and the proponents of a substitute measure 
introduced by Christian A. Herter, then a Republican Congressman from 
Massachusetts. (Point Four--Our Chance to Achieve Freedom from Fear, 
Current Affairs Press, 1949; also Faith, Purpose and Power, Farrar Straw 8 
Young, 1950; How to Coexist Without Playing the Kremlin's Garne, Beacon 
Press, 1952; and Turning Point Toward Peace, chapters 5 and 6 already 
cited.) 
resources of $100 miUion pennit, to broaden the field at least a 
little. 
As for private investment in the underdeveloped areas, the 
ten year total of such American investment, apart from the exploita- 
tion of mineral resources, has amounted to only about $100 million. 
As against this paltry sum, private investment in the United States 
has averaged over $45 billion each year. The reason is obvious. 
Private capital seeks maximum profit at minimum risk. Before 
private investors will venture into the underdeveloped areas to any 
substantial extent, seed-money supplied out of public funds must 
create the political and economic conditions which will attract 
private venture capital. Even then, private capital will not always 
be welcome, because it has so long been associated with colonial 
rule and foreign exploitation. 
3. The third major change in our foreign econamic policy 
advocated by this writer ever since economic assistance programs 
were initiated is to shift the emphasis from the bilateral to the 
multilateral approach. This idea has recently gained a number of 
important adherents. Among political leaders, Governor Adlai 
Stevenson, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and New York's 
Governor Averell Harriman have advocated such a course. The 
intluential newspaper publisher, John Cowles, of Minneapolis, has 
vigorously urged channeling aid through the United Nations. At 
least two writers who formerly supported bilateral aid programs- 
Barbara Ward and Willard Espy-have recently espoused a multi- 
lateral approach. On the other hand, President Eisenhower has, 
so far, rejected the idea and Congressional sentiment its a whole 
is probably not yet ready for it. 
It has always seemed to this observet extremely unwise for the 
United States to let itself appear either as the world's harsh banker 
or the world's benevolent rich uncle. Instead of making ourselves 
the sole judges as to the legitimate needs of other peoples and then 
providing such aid as we might see fit in each individual case, it 
would seem a wiser and a more effective course to channel our 
contribution through the United Nations, preferably through a new 
United Nations Development Authority created for this purpose. 
In the past, four major arguments have appeared to me to support 
this contention: 
a) A United Nations Development Authority would be better 
equipped than are Washington bureaucrats and Congressional 
committees to evaluate relative needs for capital assistance and to 
decide what conditions, if any, should be attached to such aid. 
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b) Conditions imposed by a United Nations Authority would 
I be more readily accepted by the beneficiary governments than the - '  
same conditions if imposed by the United States. This is especially - 
- important with respect to fostering land reform and the creation - 
- - .  
of agricultural credit facilities in countries oppressed by large land- 
holders and usurious money-lenders. 
c) A United Nations Development Authority could more 
- readily make long-range plans and enter into long-range commit- 
ments than can the American government. Successful economic * 
,. development requires long-range planning and the assurance that - 
l r  capital for approved plans will be forthcoming. 
- d) It would be far easier for our Congress to appropriate 
annual global contributions to a United Nations Development 
. Authority than to make up its mind each year how many, if any, : 
dollars to allot to each individual applicant for assistance. (The *; 
contention that Congress cannot legally appropriate funds for more 
than one year at a time may be technically correct but it has 
' 
certainly been violated in the case of such domestic programs as 
river development or naval construction, which by their nature 
extend over a period of years.) 
To these four arguments there is now added a fifth: 
e) The more we channel our aid to economic development ; 
through the United Nations, the more we challenge the Soviet j 
Union to meet our contributions. To the extent that Soviet aid 
can be made to flow through the United Nations, it will be stripped 
of political overtones. Thus this particular modification of Ameri- 
can policy could be an important factor in converting Soviet- 
American competition into cooperation. 
4. Finally, the use of surplus food as capital-an idea as yet 
insufficiently explored--could help us to kill two birds with one 
stone: it would dispose of presently useless surpluses costly to US 
and dangerous to other agricultural producers, while at the same 
time reducing the amount of money we should have to appropriate ; 
to meet our commitments to a United Nations Development - 
Authority. * i 
These four major changes in our approach to aiding world , 
economic development would, I believe, provide the necessary 1 
3 
/ 
4 .  * Professor Matthew Kust of Harvard University, has made a revealing 
I - 
Y 
study of how this idea could be applied to India. A broader application has 
recently been suggested by Haldore Hanson of the Public Affairs Institute, 
Washington, D. C. See also op. cit. Turning Point Toward Peace, pages 
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; point of departure for the formation of the urgently needed policy 
revision. 
The Eisenhower administration's Foreign Aid Bill of 1956 
and the debate over this measure in the Congress gave the impres- 
sion that the American government was almost wholly unaware 
of the need for a new approach. Yet there is considerable evi- 
dence that, behind the scenes, serious thought is being given to the 
matter. The writings of Chester Bowles, our former ambassador 
to India, and a scholarly study by Professors Max F. Millikan and 
W. W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have 
had careful attention. The report made to the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee by Representatives Brooks Hays, Democrat of 
Arkansas, and Chester E. Merrow, Republican of New Hampshire 
-both members of the 1956 United States Delegation to the 
United Nations-shows that there is increasing Congressional 
understanding. Other studies, such as that undertaken under the 
auspices of the Public Affairs Institute of Washington, D. C., evi- 
dence the growing interest of labor organizations and cooperatives. 
My own study was widely distributed by religious, educational and 
other civic organizations. 
Progress is regrettably slow but, nevertheless, some of the 
fixed ideas and inflexible positions are beginning to thaw out. It 
is beginning to be recognized that it is foolish to attach political 
and especially military strings to economic aid and that it is idle 
to rail at "socialism" or to seek to promote "free enterprise cap- 
italism" in countries where there is no private capital and where 
government action in the economic field is essential to progress. 
Under the leadership of President Eisenhower, at least one wing 
of the Republican party has been converted to support of more 
liberal foreign trade policies. On the other hand, the growing 
industrialization of the South has brought considerable reinforce- 
ments to the Republican right wing from ultra-copservative ', . 
Southern Democrats. \ 
The chief stumbling block to the urgently needed new 
approach to foreign economic policy remains the reluctance to 
appropriate the necessary public funds. This derives less from 
a failure to understand the need than from obsolete, pinch-penny 
conceptions of internal economic policy. 
If domestic "budgetitis" is the first obstacle to be overcome, 
"pactitis"-the obsessive preoccupation with forming and sustain- 
ing worldwide military alliances-runs a close second. This brings 
us to a consideration of -the politico-military dilemma in which we 
find ourselves at the present time. 
WANTED: A NEW APPROACH TO 
A CHANGING WORLD. 
I. BEWILDERMENT ON CAPITOL HILL 
It became apparent, during the early months of 1956 that, in 
spite of the rapidly changing international scene, the Eisenhower 
administration had no intention of undertaking any basic reexam- 
ination, much less a revision of its foreign policy, at least until 
after the November elections. Democratic aspirants to the Presi- 
dency and some of the Democrats in the Congress were vocal in 
their criticism of the smug self-satisfaction of the Republican 
Secretary of State, of his sometimes tactless or boastful pronounce- 
ments and of what they called "Republican bluff, blunder and 
bluster." But, whereas there was considerable criticism of execu- 
tion, there was scarcely any indication that the Democrats desired, 
any more than the Republicans, to question the basic premises of 
a policy the bankruptcy of which was daily becoming more 
apparent. 
This curious and, to me, alarming bipartisan silence as to the 
fundamental questions of foreign policy inspired the following 
letter, addressed to the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations: 
The Honorable Walter F. George 
Washington, D. C. 
April 9, 1956 
Dear Senator George: 
Since our correspondence last autumn* matters have 
gone from bad to worse. Not only has the predicted 
Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive materialized 
but affairs in the Middle East have taken an even more 
serious turn than anticipated. This letter is prompted by 
a deep concern over the fact that the mounting crisis 
does not as yet seem to have stirred either Congress or 
the administration to effective action. 
It is now perfectly clear that the two immediate aims 
of Soviet policy are: 
1. To win the friendship or at least the benevolent 
neutrality of the uncommitted peoples of Asia and the 
* Concerning the writer's proposals published in 1955. 
Middle East, thereby outflanking the Atlantic Com- 
munity and eventually encircling it. 
2. TO weaken the Atlantic Alliance at its vital center 
by encouraging neutralism, fostering cleavages among 
the participants and, if possible, isolating the United 
States. 
In recent months, Soviet leadership has made dan- 
gerous progress in both directions. 
Is it not apparent that the present bipartisan foreign 
policy of the United States is inadequate to meet this 
challenge and that, in fact, some of its aspects play 
directly into the Kremlin's hands? 
In the Far East, we are frozen into immobility by 
our stubborn refusal to recognize the unpalatable but 
immutable fact that there is no way to settle the ques- 
tions of Korea, Indo-China and Formosa by peaceful 
means, except through negotiation with the Chinese 
People's Republic. You, yourself, have issued several 
statesmanlike appeals for such negotiations. Meanwhile, 
in the absence of direct, high-level negotiation, we 
remain poised indefinitely at the brink of war. Not only 
that, but we increasingly alienate our allies and potential 
friends by a policy which seems dangerous and unrea- 
sonable to all except Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman 
Rhee, both of whom openly desire war. 
Last July, you wisely warned against our allowing 
our support of our European allies to place us in a false 
- - 
position with respect to the emerging peoples of Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. The disregard of that warn- 
ing has had disastrous consequences. The subordination 
of political considerations to the attempt to complete an 
encircling band of military pacts and alliances has failed 
to create military strength and has, on the other hand, 
created precisely that political weakness and dissension 
which the communists desired to exploit. 
The SEAT0 alliance has weakened rather than 
strengthened the anticommunist front in Asia by antag- 
onizing India and Burma, creating an atmosphere 
throughout Southeast Asia dangerously receptive to 
Soviet propaganda. Our insistence upon Japanese 
-- - -  
rearmament, in violation of the constitution which we 
against us. A 
Planning Corn- 
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mission expressed the opinion that the West is in the 
process of losing Southeast Asia. As Southeast Asia 
goes, so, inevitably, goes Japan. If Southeast Asia 
goes communist, Japan will be unable to live except by 
trade with countries under Sino-Soviet domination. 
In the Middle East, the abortive attempt to erect a 
military barrier against Russia has merely opened the 
door to communist political penetration. The Baghdad 
Pact has split the Arab world, brought Israel and the 
Arab states to the verge of war and made Egypt into 
the focal center of an anti-Western revolt which has 
spread from Asia Minor into North Africa. Our two 
major allies, France and Britain, now face the loss of 
possessions which would render the one politically 
impotent and the other financially bankrupt. 
Perhaps most serious of all is the effect of this 
disaster upon the organization of states which form the 
heart and soul of the anti-communist coalition. The 
southeastern flank of the NATO alliance has disin- 
tegrated. Greece is disaffected because of its quarrel 
with Britain over Cypms. Greece and Turkey are no 
longer on speaking terms. Tito has withdrawn into 
neutralism. 
Worse yet, on the vital central front of NATO, the 
cream of the French contingents have been withdrawn 
into North Africa. The 12 West German divisions, for 
the sake of which we have wrecked our European policy 
and foreclosed the hope of a German peace settlement, 
will not exist for three years-if, indeed, they ever come 
into existence as a reliable reinforcement of NATO. 
German sentiment is rapidly veering away from Chan- 
cellor Adenauer's leadership. 
The British, the French, the Italians and the -2 
i Germans are openly demanding a basic revision of 
* -  
coalition policy. The bankruptcy of that 
apparent in every part of the world. 
What more could the Russians desire? What more 
is required to make the United States un 
d 
T. + 
serious reexamination of the premises up 
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has been operating? 
The fact is that Stalin's aggressive tactics originally 
', frightened us into making two assumptions 
. I was invited to testify before your Committee. These 
assumptions were : 
1. That Western Europe constituted the primary 
target of Soviet expansionism; and 
2. That the aggressive designs of international 
communism would be carried out primarily by 
military means. 
These assumptions led us into twofold error. They 
led us to adopt a Europe-oriented policy in Asia and the 
Middle East, instead of a policy based upon the condi- 
tions existing in those areas. They led us to attempt the 
building of a world-wide anti-communist coalition upon 
the sole foundation of military defense against political 
invasion. 
To undermine such a structure, Stalin's heirs needed 
only to make a convincing show of renouncing warlike 
intentions and to support Asian and Arab nationalism. 
The first move was easy because the Russians them- 
selves had never wanted a major war. The second was 
made possible by our failure to lay the political, eco- 
nomic and psychological foundations for an effective 
anti-communist coalition. 
The situation is not yet hopeless, but it is rapidly 
deteriorating and may well become hopeless unless the 
United States takes remedial action within the next few 
months. 
Since the administration seems unwilling or unable 
to undertake the necessary revision and revitalization of 
American policy, could not such action be initiated by 
your Committee? 
Copies of this letter were sent by the writer to each member 
of the Foreign Relations Committee and to a few other leading 
members of the Senate, along with a personal note asking for an 
expression of opinion. Some of the replies received were per- 
functory; others expressed varying degrees of interest. It was a 
significant fact that not a single Senator took issue with the analysis 
presented and that not a single Senator defended or expressed 
satisfaction with the existing foreign policy. Several Senators 
went out of their way to welcome the suggestion that a serious 
study be undertaken by the Foreign Relations Committee. The 
following excerpts serve as examples : 
I hope that the Foreign Relations Committee will 
give careful study and thought to the issues raised in 
your communication which I found both interesting 
and very provocative. I agree with you that it is high 
time for the United States to undertake a serious 
re-examination of the premises upon which it is operat- 
ing in the foreign field. 
I want you to know of the pleasure with which I 
read your letter to Senator George. I think it is one of 
the most complete, concise and accurate statements of 
the present deplorable situation in the conduct of our 
foreign affairs that I have seen. 
I am sure that you appreciate that I agree with you 
on many matters mentioned in your letter. . . . I cer- 
tainly do not think you understate the dangers facing us 
abroad. 
You and I have held views with regard to the Soviet 
menace which have closely paralleled each other over a 
period of years. Particularly with reference to the 
rearming of Germany it now seems clear that we were 
right and the administration wrong. . . 
The first three excerpts were from Democrats; the last was 
from a Republican. 
Senator George himself said in his reply: 
As you know, I have been concerned for some time 
with the problems raised in your letter and have recently 
suggested that the Committee on Foreign Relations 
undertake a comprehensive review of our foreign aid 
programs. I am enclosing a copy of the preliminary 
memorandum which I submitted to the Committee on 
this subject. 
The memorandum suggested the appointment by the Senate 
of a committee of qualified experts authorized to make a study of 
foreign aid and to present its recommendations when Congress 
reconvened in January, 1957. Concerning this proposal, I ven- 
tured to make two comments: first, that the world would not stand 
still until 1957 just because the United States was preoccupied 
with electing a President and a new Congress; and, second, that 
not merely our foreign aid programs but our entire foreign policy 
stood in need of reexamination and revision. I expressed doubt 
whether even the best new foreign aid program could be effective 
in the existing context of inflexible, static policy with respect to the 
rapidly changing political problems of Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East. Nothing came of the suggestion for a broader inquiry. 
Senate Resolution 285, adopted on July 1 1, 1956, provided only 
for a study of the foreign aid programs. 
As a matter of fact, nothing in the way of constructive legis- 
lation in the field of foreign affairs came out of the entire second 
session of the 84th Congress. The President made a half-hearted 
effort to obtain approval of United States membership in the 
Organization for Trade Cooperation. This matter was shunted 
aside by bipartisan agreement. As for foreign aid, the President's 
so-called Mutual Security Bill asked for $4.9 billion for the fiscal 
year beginning July 1, 1 956. Of this amount, $4.1 billion was for 
military aid and "defense support". Only $470 million was allotted 
to economic development. Senator Mike Mansfield (D) of Mon- 
tana called the measure "more of the same old medicine in a new 
bottle". Other Congressional leaders were critical of the over- 
emphasis upon military aid and the lack of any indication that the 
administration was giving constructive thought to meeting the 
Soviet economic offensive, but none of these leaders developed any 
counter-proposals. After long debate, Congress finally contented 
itself with lopping off a little over $1 billion, chiefly from the 
military aid appropriations. 
In part, Congressional opposition derived from the growing 
conviction that the whole program offered by the administration 
was obsolete; in part it was based upon reluctance to continue 
any kind of foreign aid at all. Yet, in contrast to the expressed 
reservations as to the value of military aid to allied countries, 
Congress insisted upon adding $900 million to the $35 billion 
requested by the President for our own military establishments. 
As the legislators hurried home to their constituencies with 
their minds on the coming elections, they left behind a peculiar 
impression. They had made clear their awareness that some sort 
of a new, non-military approach to the sharpening world crisis 
was needed, but they had done nothing to develop any such 
approach. They had, in the last analysis, been content to follow 
the administration's political judgment, which was to leave foreign 
policy frozen in its inflexible mold, at least until after the elections. 
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Yet they had questioned and over-ridden the President's judgment 
in the very field in which they considered him most competent, by ' 
giving him more than he thought wise or necessary for the United ' . 
States Strategic Air Force and less than he considered a safe 
minimum for military aid to allied governments. 
Confronted with the picture of crumbling military alliances 
abroad, the mood of Congress had been to turn away from such 
alliances rather than to search for means of strengthening them. 
Confronted with revelations of hitherto unsuspected Soviet prog- 
ress in approaching air-atomic parity, Congress acted with haste 
and determination to spur on a greater American effort. 
11. CONFUSION IN THE PENTAGON 
This obvious trend toward going it alone-toward a sort of 
latter-day isolationism in the military field-was nourished by the 
confused and often contradictory statements emanating from the 
highest American military officials. If bewilderment reigned on 
Capitol Hill, there was even greater confusion in the Pentagon. 
One school of thought insisted upon the vital importance of pre- 
paredness to meet "brushfire wars" with conventional forces. 
Another school placed its emphasis almost solely upon air-atomic 
retaliatory power. Insistence upon the value of conventional forces 
implied the belief that only "tactical" nuclear weapons would ever 
be used in any future war. On the other hand, reliance upon 
air-atomic retaliatory power implied that any aggression would be 
met by the use of "strategic"-that is to say, thermonuclear 
weapons of massive destructive power. 
The great debate between these two schools of thought was 
waged for the most part in secret. Yet enough of it leaked out 
to cause the anxious layman to ask himself at least two questions: 
1. Can there be any "brushfire wars", except perhaps in a 
few remote parts of the world where the vital interests of the 
great powers are not yet directly involved? 
2. Can air-atomic retaliatory power in the hands of a nation, 
like the United States, which will obviously be most reluctant to 
use it, deter a series of local aggressions? In other words, will a 
deterrent deter, if it is of such a nature that the execution of the 
retaliatory threat involves not only mass murder but probable 
suicide? 
My own answer to these two questions is negative. 
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There can be no "brushfire wars" which will not sooner or 
later hvolve the interests of the powers possessing nuclear 
weapons. There are presently only three such powers: the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Unless these weapons 
are abolished by reliably enforced disarmament, there will soon be 
many more "atomic powers". If any "brushfire war" goes against 
the interests of an atomic power, it will use atomic weapons rather 
than suffer defeat. 
It is nonsense to think that, in such an event, only "tactical" 
atomic weapons will be employed. (This is the concept upon 
which NATO planning for the defense of Western Europe has been 
based.) 
In the first place, what are "tactical" targets? Surely, they 
include not only troops in the field but roads, railroads, bridges, 
airfields and centers of communication. 
Secondly-and this is not generally realized-nuclear weap- 
ons of less than a megaton (the equivalent of less than 1 million 
tons of TNT) do not send their radioactive clouds into the strato- 
sphere and, hence, the radioactive fall-out per ton of force i s  
actually greater from small bombs than from superbombs. More- 
over, "tactical" bombs have a greater fall-out because they are 
exploded closer to the ground and pick up more radioactive 
material. Had "tactical" atomic weapons been used in Korea, it 
is quite possible that tens of thousands of Japanese might have 
been killed. Had they been used on the besiegers of Dienbienphu, 
no one knows how many casualties might have resulted in Burma, 
Thailand and Malaya. 
Now suppose that Country "X" and Country "Y" are at war 
and that both possess a full range of atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons. If the wind happens to blow in such a direction that 
millions of people die in Country " X  because of Country "Y's" use 
of "tactical" atomic weapons at the front, are we to assume that 
Country "X" will not at once retaliate with the most lethal weapons 
in its possession? 
As for the second question, it seems very doubtful whether 
the threat of air-atomic retaliation, employed against a nation 
possessing approximately equal air-atomic power, would deter 
such a nation from small, local adventures. As matters stand today, 
China might be deterred from attempting to seize Matsu or 
Quemoy, unless backed by Soviet air-atomic power, but it is hard to 
conceive of Russia being deterred by fear of American air-atomic 
retaliation from seizing a strip of Finnish territory or a few border 
villages in Iran-assuming that she had any desire to do so. The 
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Russians surely know that the United States would be most 
unlikely to attempt a defense of either Finland or a few Iranian 
villages by committing suicide. 
Indeed, for the defense of what nation or what territory 
would the American people commit suicide? This is the question 
we must answer, if we place our sole reliance upon air-atomic 
retaliatory power. 
Against a would-be aggressor possessing air-atomic power 
or assured of its certain support, retaliatory air-atomic power can 
be relied upon as a deterrent only to restrain a full-scale nuclear 
attack or a local adventure which the would-be aggressor knows 
to be a certain provocation to N1-scale nuclear war. 
The simple truth is that, until the threat and the blackmail 
power of nuclear weapons are abolished, we must maintain air- 
atomic superiority, realizing that it protects us only against full- 
scale air-atomic attack. But the further truth is that all war 
between nations possessing nuclear weapons is now unthinkable; 
that any war is now likely to involve such nations; and that ever 
more costly defense establishments of whatsoever nature can at 
best only preserve an increasingly intolerable balance of terror. 
III. DISARMAMENT 
The corollary to these conclusions is that the achievement 
of reliably enforced universal disarmament should be the overrid- 
ing objective of every nation's foreign policy. 
Such is not the case with respect to American foreign policy 
at the present time. 
It-is a shocking fact-and yet a fact we ought to face-that 
if the communist dictatorships were suddenly to declare their 
wilIingness to adhere to a plan of reliably enforced disarmament, 
we in this country would find ourselves wholly unready to accept it. 
This is partly because we cling to a concept of national 
sovereignty irrelevant to the atomic age, and partly because our 
leaders-with a few notable exceptions*-have for years played 
with the idea of universal disarmament without ever coming to 
grips with the basic facts of the problem. They say over and over 
* One of these notable exceptions has been former Air Force Secretary, 
Thomas K. Finletter. Another has been Senator Ralph E. Flanders (R) of 
Vermont, whose speech, delivered June 29, 1956, on the floor of the Senate, 
not only pointed out the urgent necessity for disarmament but vigorously 
asserted its practicability. 
The nearest that official American policy ever came to dealing with the 
basic questions involved in disarmament was when the United States put 
forward its original proposal for the international control of atomic energy. 
This proposal, however, failed to deal with disarmament as a whole. 
DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 
again-and rightly so-that the United States will not disarm, 
except under a universally adopted plan providing for foolproof 
enforcement. So far, so good. But what our leaders appear 
either not to know or else knowingly to conceal from the people 
is that there can be no foolproof plan of enforcement without the 
establishment of a supranational enforcement agency endowed 
with the exclusive right to maintain and, if necessary, to use armed 
force to prevent or suppress aggression. 
There can be no peace among nations, any more than there 
can be peace in a community of individuals, without law and a 
policeman to enforce it. There can be no law without some form 
of government. Anyone who speaks seriously of universal enforced 
disarmament, necessarily speaks of the enactment of some degree 
of world law and the establishment of an enforcement agency 
having some of the attributes of a world government. 
These are, I know, fighting words to many patriotic Ameri- 
cans. Even the most limited form of "world government" means 
to them "letting foreigners rule ow country". Of course, it means 
no such thing. It does mean relinquishing to a supranational 
agency of strictly defined and limited powers the right to maintain 
or use armed force. It does mean contributing to the support of 
that limited world government, but the cost of such a contribution 
would be only an infinitesimal fraction of what we now spend 
on our national military establishments. 
Let me quite bluntly state the facts as I see them: 
1. There is no way to limit war or control the size and 
nature of armaments. So long as there is the possibility of any 
nation resorting to armed aggression, the attempt to limit the 
kinds or numbers of weapons to be employed in war will be 
utterly futile. 
2. Either we abolish war and national armaments altogether, 
or we must rely upon what used to be called a balance of power 
and is now quite properly called a "balance of terror". 
3. We cannot abolish war and national armaments by any 
agreement resting upon good faith. We need an armed enforce- 
ment agency standing above the disarmed nations. 
4. We cannot have such an enforcement agency unless we 
are willing, along with all the other nation-states, to participate 
in its creation, in its endowment with adequate powers and in its 
maintenance. 
5. If we are not ready to make the strictly limited sacrifice 
of sovereignty which this entails, then we had better stop talking 
about universal disarmament. 
I am convinced that if the American people had the prob- 
lem presented to them in these terms and if they were shown a 
concrete plan illustrating how such a supranational enforcement 
agency would work, they would surprise our timid bipartisan 
leadership by giving it their overwhelming approval. But no 
American President nor Secretary of State nor candidate for these 
high offices has as yet stated the problem of disarmament in these 
unvarnished terms. 
The reason why the case has not been presented in this simple 
fashion is not that the difliculties involved in formulating such 
a plan are insuperable. A number of private citizens have put 
forward drafts which might well serve as a starting point, the most 
useful, in my judgment, being the studies undertaken by the emi- 
nent lawyer, Grenville Clark, in association with Professor Louis 
B. Sohn of Harvard University. 
Nor is the reason for bipartisan silence on this subject the 
obvious probability that the Russians would at present reject 
any plan of foolproof enforcement. This is merely the excuse 
for intellectual laziness and political cowardice. 
Consider, if you please, what would be the effect upon the 
world's peoples if the United States were to lay before them for 
discussion a concrete plan for enforced disarmament which the 
American people had approved in principle and stood ready to 
adopt. Consider what would be the effect on the world's peoples 
if such a plan were rejected by the communist dictators. Is it not 
clear that this would be the surest way to demonstrate where in 
the present world lie the real obstacles to the establishment of 
enduring peace? And would not such a development bring an 
almost irresistible pressure to bear upon the communist dictator- 
ships? 
Before we can undertake such a demonstration, however, we 
must educate ourselves to the point where an American President 
could put forward such a proposal knowing that he had the full 
support of the Congress and the people. Are we now educating 
ourselves in that direction? Are any of our leaders trying to pro- 
mote discussion and understanding? Have any of us demanded 
that candidates for office, from the Presidency down, tell us where 
they stand on this issue? 
The answer to all three questions is negative. As a result, 
the world senses that our words about disarmament are empty 
of meaning. The world knows, even if most Americans do not 
realize it, that our government has retreated from seeking a fool- 
proof method of disarmament to a mere quest for a system of 
inspection which would give adequate advance warning of a sur- 
prise attack. President Eisenhower's "open-sky'proposal was an 
effective gesture of goodwill, but careful scrutiny shows it to be 
nothing more than a proposal to instdl a burglar alarm system 
without providing any means of frustrating or apprehending the 
burglar. 
There can be very little doubt that the vast majority of other 
Western nations would gladly go along with the United States, 
if the United States were prepared to take a constructive lead. 
A few leaders, hopelessly wedded to the now bankrupt policy of 
winning the cold war through a show of military strength, might 
still object; but it is diflicult to imagine their being able to sus- 
tain their objection even in their own countries. 
As matters now stand, it appears to the majority of the 
world's peoples that, while the Russians want disarmament and 
have moved forward a little toward permitting adequate inspection 
and enforcement (though by no means far enough), the United 
States has actually been moving backward, away from disarma- 
ment toward some sort of a system designed merely to make the 
balance of terror a little less terrifying. 
This impression is reinforced by the Eisenhower administra- 
tion's refusal to consider a banning of further tests of nuclear 
weapons. Such a ban was suggested by Governor Adlai Stevenson 
but flatly rejected by President Eisenhower and Atomic Energy 
Commission Chairman, Lewis L. Strauss. Yet the banning of 
nuclear tests and tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles can 
now be adequately enforced by monitoring. Nuclear explosions 
can be detected by methods in use for the past six years. It 
should be perfectly possible to detect by radar the launching of 
intercontinental missiles. As Senator Ralph E. Flanders (R) of 
Vermont stated in a recent letter to the New York Times,* 
"Anything that can be monitored is ripe for negotiated control." 
Unless the United States changes its attitude toward disanna- 
ment, the United States will be chiefly responsible for the failure 
of the West to make itself the protagonist of peace. 
The relations of the West with the rest of the world's peoples 
-and, especially the peoples of the unaligned nations-will be 
affected not only by the degree of Western cooperation in pro- 
* Dated August 11, 1956, published in the N. Y. Times of August 14. 

CHAPTER THREE. 
THE NEEDED REORGANIZATION OF THE WEST. 
I. THE LACK OF WESTERN SOLIDARITY 
No matter how greatly we may wish that we could "go it 
alone9'-and this desire is strong in many Americans--our destiny 
is inextricably intertwined with that of those nations which share 
with us the heritage of Western civilization. Together we must 
succeed or fail in meeting the challenge of a world in revolution. 
The most glaring weakness of this group of Western nations 
is that it lacks inner cohesiveness, organization, a sense of com- 
mon interest and a clearly defined common purpose. 
Insofar as there is any Western policy, it is not shaped by 
consultation among the component parts of the Western com- 
munity. It is dominated by three nations: the United States, 
Great Britain and France, with Canada occasionally in the useful 
role of mediator and the Federal Republic of Germany exerting 
an increasingly unpredictable influence. 
The dominant Big Three have what might euphemistically be 
called a common policy as to Europe. They have not even the 
semblance of a common policy with respect to Asia, Africa, or 
the Middle East. Great Britain maintains touch with the mem- 
bers of the British Commonwealth, but neither the United States 
nor the Big Three as such ever think of drawing the Latin 
American republics into consultation as to Western policy, except 
where Latin American interests are directly concerned or when 
Latin American votes are wanted in the United Nations. 
Let us pause on this subject a moment. 
The sole organizational link between Latin America and the 
North Atlantic Community is via the membership of the United 
States in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in 
the Organization of American States. The consequence of 
Western neglect of Latin American interests and susceptibilities 
is a growing Latin American sympathy toward nonoWestern 
nations and a growing lack of sympathy with Anglo-French- 
American leadership. 
It is important for many reasons to draw Latin America into 
full and equal partnership with the North Atlantic nations. 
The 20 Latin American republics are inhabited by 
162,000,000 peoples, estimated to be the world's most rapidly 
growing population group. African Negroes and aboriginal Indians 
form a large part of this population; in some countries they are in 
the majority. Only if Latin America is fully integrated in a Western 
organization can the West justly maintain that it is not " a  white 
man's club". This is of crucial importance in shaping future West- 
ern relations with the peoples of Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East. 
Compared to the peoples of the North Atlantic basin, Latin 
Americans as a whole live at an extremely low level of income, 
health and education. In some countries, illiteracy runs as high 
as 80%. In many, life expectancy is not much over 30 years. 
Per capita annual income runs from about $400 in the Argentine, 
Uruguay and Cuba to less than $100 in much of Central America. 
Throughout most of the area, there is a wide gap between the few 
rich families and the multitudes of the extremely poor. Only if 
the Latin American nations become full and equal partners in an 
effectively functioning Western organization, can the West deny 
that it is "a rich man's club". This, too, is vitally important in 
shaping Western relations with the non-Western "have not" 
peoples. 
Apart from these considerations, the raw material wealth of 
Latin America and its potential as a market for manufactured 
goods make it essential to North American and West European 
prosperity, especially to the maintenance of a high living standard 
in the United States. 
Geographically and culturally, the Latin American republics 
belong to the West but their adherence to the West can by no 
means be taken for granted. Like the newly independent peoples 
of Asia and Africa, the Latin Americans are trying to catch up 
fast to the industrial and technological revolutions. They are seek- 
ing to achieve in a few years the economic status of Europe and 
North America, without having either the experience or the capital 
accumulated by Europe and North America during a century or 
more of slow development. Like the emerging peoples of Asia 
and Africa, the Latin Americans will take help where they can 
get it. If they fail to obtain it from the more developed members 
of the Western community, they will turn elsewhere and, in the 
end, cease to be members of that community. If, on the other 
hand, they are treated with respect and fairness by the West, they 
will bring to the Western community not only a wealth of natural 
resources but a vitally needed expanding economic frontier. Latin 
America can mean to the Western community of nations what 
our own West has meant to the development of the United States. 
Taken as a whole, Latin America needs more and better 
technical assistance, more public and private capital investment, 
and a stabilization of the prices of the raw materials upon the 
export of which its economic life depends. Beyond these prac- 
tical requirements, Latin America needs to be brought into the 
West on terms of equality, not as the younger brother of the 
United States but as a full-fledged partner in the Western com- 
munity. I£ this is not done soon, the Latin American republics 
may well drift, if not toward Moscow, toward alignment with the 
unaligned Bandung nations. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE 
NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 
The only part of the West that is in any sense organized 
is the so-called North Atlantic Community. The United States 
and Canada are linked to some but not to all of the nations of 
western and southern Europe in a military alliance (NATO). 
Most, but not all of the West European nations are loosely asso- 
ciated in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) and even more loosely joined in the Council of Europe. 
France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries are rather 
more closely united in the European Coal and Steel Community 
which may shortly be expanded to cover atomic energy as well. 
Western Europe's efforts to unite politically and economically 
have been frustrated by a number of obstacles, among which 
historic jealousies, prejudices and antipathies are the most obvious 
but probably not the most important. The real obstacles have 
been: 1) British unwillingness to join in any sort of political or 
economic integration; 2) French fear of being overpowered by 
Germany in an organization in which Britain does not provide a 
counterbalance; 3) the continuing partition of Germany and 4) 
the partition of what was once a natural all-European trading 
community. 
The key to this dilemma is the British position. The British 
say that they cannot accept any close political or economic ties to 
Western Europe without jeopardizing both their Commonwealth 
relationships and their alliance with the United States. This con- 
tention is, I believe, only partly valid. 
So far as Commonwealth ties are concerned, Canada has for 
some time been urging the mother country to take the lead in 
creating a strong West European entity. To my knowledge, there 
have been no objections by Australia and New Zealand. Britain's 
ties to the remaining members of the Commonwealth are now so 
loose that it is d3Ecult to see how they would be adversely affected. 
As for the Anglo-American alliance, the United States has 
consistently urged European integration, though it has refrained 
from exerting the same sort of pressure upon Britain that it has 
at times brought to bear upon the Continental nations. 
One is led to suspect that the real obstacle lies in Britain's 
desire to maintain a special position vis-a-vis the United States-a 
position senior to that of the Continental countries. This is com- 
pletely understandable, but it would seem selfevident to most 
Americans that Anglo-American relations, no matter what the 
strains put upon them, will always be more intimate and more 
firmly knit than American relations with any other country except 
Canada. 
The answer lies in reorganizing the West as a whole. Anglo- 
American relations are not strained by Britain's ties to Europe, 
nor would they be strained if these bonds were to be strengthened. 
Anglo-American relations are strained by the absence of a common 
policy, especially in Asia and the Middle East. 
The West is doomed unless it adopts a common policy to 
insure its survival. There is no way to form a common policy 
except by consultation, compromise and eventual agreement 
among the sovereign nation-states. If France is going to reject 
consultation about North Africa, if Great Britain is going to say 
that Cyprus is strictly a British affair, and if the United States is 
going to resent interference with its policy in the Far East, then 
there can be no Western solidarity. Until Western solidarity is 
achieved, the West will remain a prey to the "divide and conquer" 
diplomacy of the Kremlin. 
Let me make quite clear that I am not talking about an 
organic federation of the Western nations, nor about any form of 
closely knit political union. The component parts of "the West" 
are too different and too widely separate to make union feasible. 
Western Europe can federate, if the obstacles already discussed can - 
be overcome. Latin America could perhaps some day form a 
United States of Latin America. It is conceivable, though unlikely, 
that Great Britain, Canada and the United States might form an 
organic union. But even if these rather remote possibilities were 
realized, it would still remain to create a common policy for the 
three Western federations. 
For the purpose of meeting the immediate challenge, the 
integration of the West need go no farther than the creation of a 
Council in which common policy toward the non-Western world 
is thrashed out and agreed upon. This is the maximum of the 
presently attainable. It is likewise the minimum required for the 
u ~ v a l  of Western civilization-assuming that any form of % Forty 
civilization can be expected to survive for long without the aboli- 
tion of war through universal, effectively enforced disarmament. 
At the present time, the NATO military alliance forms the 
chief organizational link between Great Britain and Wester o 
Europe on one side of the Atlantic and the United States and 
Canada on the other. The rapidly declining morale of this organi- 
zation belatedly caused the Western leaders to realize in the spring 
of 1956, that "something had to be done". It was perhaps an 
encouraging sign that the committee of three, appointed in May 
by the NATO Council to decide what should be done, did not, 
for once, consist of the representatives of Great Britain, France 
and the United States. Instead, the study group was composed 
of the foreign ministers of Canada, Norway and Italy. 
lI. WHAT CAN BE DONE? A PROPOSAL 
- The writer ventured to submit to the chairman of this study 
group, Canada's Secretary for External Affairs Lester Be Pearson, 
an analysis of NATO's trouble and a proposal for breathing new 
life into the North Atlantic Community.* Its essence was the 
following : 
The decline of NATO morale was attributed to three major 
causes : 
First: The shift in Soviet tactics and the apparent diminution 
of the danger of military attack had created a certain apathy if not 
a sense of greater security among the peoples of Western Europe, 
dissolving the temporary solidarity inspired by common fear. 
Second: The belated comprehension of what would happen 
to Europe in any war fought with atomic weapons, irrespective of 
its outcome, had raised grave doubts in European minds as to 
the defensive or deterrent value of maintaining at great cost 
the contingents of conventional forces required under the NATO 
alliance. 
Third: The decision to re-arm West Germany as a partner 
in NATO had caused a wide-open cleavage in European opinion, , 
I .  
one segment of which then and there became permanently . -,; 
3 . '  
alienated. This applied not only to the European peoples who , 
- - 
'. .. had suffered at German hands but to the ~e-mans  themselves;:. ur 
German opposition to NATO membership had steadily mounted 
because of the increasingly evident bankruptcy of a Dulles- 
Adenauer policy which sought to force from Russia what amounted 
to an unconditional surrender with respect to the terms of an all- 
German peace settlement. 
This analysis led the writer to the conclusion, that, if NATO 
was to survive as a military alliance, its strategic concepts would 
have to be drastically revised and its policy with respect to 
Germany radically altered. It was suggested that the point of 
departure for such a revision should be Western sponsorship of 
the military neutralization of a reunified Germany on terms which, 
while excluding Germany from NATO, would not prevent its 
becoming a full-fledged member of the Atlantic Community in 
every sense other than that of a military alliance. It was pointed 
out that, in these circumstances, Gemany would not become a 
political vacuum, cut loose from its Western moorings. * 
Beyond a revision of NATO, however, the writer's analysis 
of the Atlantic Community problem led to an additional and 
more far-reaching conclusion. This was that NATO, while neces- 
sary in the continued absence of disarmament, was actually not 
the instrument through which Western solidarity could or should 
be revitalized. 
It was suggested that, if the West were to regain its inner 
unity and to recapture the moral leadership of the world, it would 
have to present itself to the world in a garb other than that of 
a military alliance. It was pointed out that we, of the West, 
rightly think of the Atlantic Basin as the breeding ground of free- 
dom, but that we tend to forget that, in the eyes of many of the 
world's peoples, the Atlantic Community is also the cradle of 
colonialism and the breeding ground of many wars. Therefore, 
it was held to be neither fitting nor expedient for the vital qnter 
of Western civilization to stand embodied before the world in a 
military orgadzation-especially a military organization dominated 
by three nations of which two have been and still are the world's 
greatest colonial powers. 
The writer then put forward the view that, in order to revital- 
ize itself and its influence, the West should organize and be 
* This proposal was previously submitted in some detail to President 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in December, 1952, before the 
Republican administration took office. It was later published in a pamphlet, 
France, Germany and NATO (Current Affairs Press, 1953) and elaborated 
in Germany, Key to Peace (Harvard University Press, 1953.) The idea of 
military neutralization, at first unpopular in Germany, has now gained 
wide support and may be the decisive issue in the 1957 West German 
elections. 
represented by an entity which would be recognized by all the 
world's peoples as an instrument of progress toward greater 
freedom, human betterment and lasting peace. This, it was 
argued, could not be accomplished by giving NATO new jobs 
to do or by creating a "cabinet" charged with the consideration 
of political and economic problems, as suggested by Secretary 
Ddes  last May. It could be accomplished only by bringing into 
being a wholly new, non-military Western Council. 
What would be the functions of this new embodiment of the 
Western heritage? 
It would concern itself, first of all, with developing the 
political, social and economic solidarity of the Western Community. 
It would seek to develop a common Western policy with respect 
to other parts of the world, especially with regard to the peoples 
emerging or seeking to emerge into national independence. It 
would speak for the West in dealings with the Sino-Soviet orbit, 
instead of leaving such negotiations to be conducted by the Ameri- 
can, British and French foreign ministers. 
The new Council's chief aims in such negotiations with 
Moscow and Peking would be to reach local peace settlements 
and an overall disarmament agreement effectively enforced by the 
United Nations. With these aims achieved, the Council would 
have accomplished its major purpose and could then dissolve into 
a fully functioning world organization. 
Since membership in the new Western organization would 
involve no military commitments whatever, it is conceivable 
that even such determined European neutrals as Sweden and 
Switzerland might be willing to join, along with a militarily 
neutralized Germany. Should Russia reject the proposal as to 
Germany's military neutralization and subsequent membership in 
the new, nonmilitary Western Council, the West could still pro- 
ceed to admit West Germany, releasing it from NATO and thus 
placing the onus for continued partition squarely upon the Kremlin. 
Were this suggestion to be adopted, the instrumentality would 
have been created by which could be achieved not only a broader 
and more effective unity of the North Atlantic nations but a drawing 
into full-fledged partnership of the Latin American republics. It 
would remain to be seen whether the two "Western" nations of the 
antipodes, Australia and New Zealand, would prefer to join the 
Council or to co-operate with it via their Commonwealth relation- 
ship. 
It may be thought that so large a deliberative body would 
become unwieldy. That danger, of course, exists in any organiza- 
tion founded upon the principles of democratic representation. 
In all probability, the full membership of the Western Council 
would annually elect a smaller executive body, giving appropriate 
regional representation to the component parts of the Western 
community. It might well be that such an executive body would 
remain in continuous session, calling the full Council to make final 
decisions but preparing the groundwork for such action. 
The crucial question concerns quality rather than quantity. 
The proposed Council can be effective only if its members send 
their best qualified statesmen as representatives. One might sup- 
pose that, in many cases, these might be the same men who 
represent the Western nations at the United Nations, especially if 
the Council were to choose a site in or near the United Nations 
establishment. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON POLICY. 
The suggested organization of a Western Council would 
create the instrumentality through which a common Western 
policy might be developed, but this alone would not assure the 
formation of such a policy. More is needed than the creation of 
a forum for intra-Western discussion and debate. There must 
come into being a common determination that full discussion shall 
lead to whatever compromises are necessary in order to reach 
agreement, at the very least in four major areas. 
The West must, first of all, establish a common policy with 
regard to its own heartland; that is to say, with regard to the kind 
of peace settlement it seeks in Europe. Until this is done, it will 
be difficult to reach agreement on a common policy concerning 
other areas, if only because European interests extend into so 
many parts of the nonoWestern world. 
Second: the West must formulate a common policy with 
respect to the hostile communist dictatorships. 
Third: there must be agreement upon a policy toward the 
nations which remain uncommitted in the stmggle between the 
West and the communist dictatorships. 
Fourth-and, in the long run, perhaps most important of all 
-the Western nations must agree upon a common policy with 
respect to the dependent or semi-dependent peoples seeking inde- 
pendence. 
The greatest single obstacle to the development of a common 
Western policy in any of these areas is an outworn concept of 
national sovereignty. In spite of the growing interdependence of 
nation-states and the indivisibility of survival, the idea persists that 
it is the exclusive prerogative of national governments each to 
pursue by its chosen means whatever it conceives to be its particu- 
lar national interest. The greater and more powerful a nation- 
state, the more its government seems to cling to its sovereign pre- 
rogatives, resenting external interference with its policies and 
actions. Yet the truth is that the national interest of every West- 
em nation demands the curtailment of sovereign rights in the inter- 
est of solidarity and survival. 
I. TOWARD A EUROPEAN PEACE SETTLEMENT . - - ,  .,I , , , 
The avowed aim of the Western powers is to move Russia - - -  
back out of eastern Europe to its own borders and to "liberate" . -
. -= 
. the satellites. In some respects, this is an unrealistic aim; in others, , t 
it may be attainable. 
- 
It is unrealistic to aim at the restoration of the Europe which 
. .- existed prior to 1938. The West's betrayal of Czechoslovakia 
severed the ties which had bound central and eastern Europe to 
France and Britain, leaving Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria a prey to Hitler and, after Hitler's 
downfall, to the tender mercies of Josef Stalin. The consequences 
of "appeasement", of fighting World War I1 with no other aim than 
the quick attainment of "unconditional surrender" and of ten years 
of Soviet domination in eastern Europe cannot be undone. Even 
if freed from Soviet overlordship, the East European nations will 
never revert to their pre-war status. They will never again become 
merely the food and raw material supplying hinterland of indus- 
trialized western Europe. Their economic foundations and their 
social structures have changed. Even with all restraints removed, 
some of these countries may well prefer to remain politically and 
economically oriented toward the Soviet Union. Some of them may 
even wish to remain "communist" in the sense in which Tito's 
Yugoslavia has remained communist. Some may wish to become 
"democracies" to the extent of reestablishing free elections, two 
or more political parties and parliamentary rule, but it seems more 
likely that these countries will become socialist rather than capitalist 
democracies, if only because of the nonexistence of any private 
capital. 
On the other hand, it is not unrealistic for the West to aim at 
bringing about a retreat of Soviet coercive power in order to 
restore freedom of choice to the East European peoples. In this 
sense, the Western .aim may be attainable. 
A German peace settlement along the lines already indicated 
would be the most promising first step in this direction. The free 
ing of 17,000,000 East Germans from Soviet domination is cer- 
tainly the only presently practical step toward "liberation". 
Unquestionably, the reaching of an all-German peace settle- 
ment is now very much more difficult than it would have been 
before West Germany was committed to rearm and to join the 
NATO alliance. Until 1950, German reunification could probably 
have been had at the price of continued demilitarization and 
neutralization. At that time, when the H bomb did not yet exist 
and when the Russians saw a real threat in the resurgence of a 
conventional German army, Germany might have been reunited, 
neutralized and left free to decide for itself to what extent, if any, 
the "socialist gains and reforms" in East Germany should be 
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retained. Today it seems likely that at least some concessions in 
this direction will have to be made, not only because the obvious 
bankruptcy of Western policy has raised the Soviet price for reunih- 
cation, but because the passage of time has more deeply imbedded 
the social and economic changes imposed by the communist East 
German regime. The probably necessary concessions-such as 
accepting as permanent the socialization of certain industries and 
the breaking up of the large landed estates-may be less painful 
for the Germans than for the Western devotees of free enterprise 
capitalism. This would certainly be true, if the Social Democrats 
should come to power in the 1957 West German elections. 
In any case, it is clear, that a German settlement negotiated 
with Russia by the Western powers is far more likely to lead to 
further progress in reuniting ~uro$e  than an all-German settle 
ment negotiated with Russia by the Germans. It is also clear that, 
if the West does not soon offer to release West Germany from 
NATO and move to seek a settlement on the basis of neutraliza- 
tion, the Germans will take matters into their own hands.* 
The question may be raised whether a neutralized Germany 
would not become a dangerously strong commercial competitor, 
particularly for a Britain heavily dependent upon export of manu- 
factured goods. This fear might be well grounded if a neutralized 
- Germany were to choose to remain disarmed, as might well have 
been the case five years ago. Such a choice on the part of the 
Germans is now extremely unlikely. There is, however, an even 
stronger reason for not taking this threat too seriously; namely, 
that if Geimany is reuliified, the burdens incident to rehabilitating 
the Soviet zone and of bringing the East German living standard 
up to parity with that existing in the Federal Republic will be 
extremely onerous. (This, as a matter of fact, is why so many 
prosperous West Germans have shown only a lip-service interest 
in reunification.) 
Assuming that the Western powers and the Soviet Union 
could agree on the reunification and military neutralization of 
Germany, the next step would be to seek the creation of the broad- 
est possible militarily neutralized belt between the mutually hostile 
camps. 
* Warnings against precisely this danger were expressed by the writer in: 
Rearming Germany-How Stupid Can We Be? (Current Mairs Press, 
1949),; France, Germany and NATO (Current AfEairs Press, 1953); Ger- 
many-Key to Peace, (Harvard University Press, 1953 ) ; Turning Point 
_ Toward Peace, Chapter 11 (Current Maim Press, 1955). Also in many 
magazine articles and letters to the editor published in various leading 
newspapers. 
Austria is already neutralized. Switzerland is traditionally 
neutral. Yugoslavia has assumed what appears to be a more or 
less permanent attitude of neutrality. If a united Germany were 
neutralized, there would have been created the beginning of a 
neutralized belt stretching from the North Sea to the Adriatic. 
This belt might later be expanded by the neutralization of other 
countries in both East and West Europe, as for example, Czecho- 
slovakia and Denmark. 
Let me emphasize once more that military neutralization 
does not mean political and economic neutralization. It involves 
no change in existing political and economic orientations. It 
does involve the withdrawal of both Russian and Western forces 
from the neutralized countries and a mutual guarantee to respect 
their neutrality. It should eventually involve the reduction of 
the military establishments maintained by the neutralized nations. 
The creation of a neutralized belt across Europe would not 
alter the Continent's fate in the event of World War 111. Nothing 
would. But the creation of such a belt would definitely reduce the 
risk of that catastrophe's occurring. 
Would Russia agree to any such proposal? There is only one 
way to find out and that is to put it forward. What we know 
for certain is that the present Western policy with respect to 
Germany is bankrupt and that, if we continue to adhere to it, 
we shall very likely lose Germany altogether and, with it, all 
control over the fate of Europe. On the other hand, if the West 
were to make such a proposal and Russia rejected it, the West 
would be reasonably sure of retaining the moral allegiance of 
the German people and of gaining in worldwide respect. 
It is perhaps well to anticipate here two questions likely to 
occur to the reader: 
1. How could the West station enough troops west of a 
neutralized Germany in order to be able to defend the remainder 
of Western Europe? 
Answer: With or without a rearmed West Germany, Western 
Europe is indefensible. In a war fought with nuclear weapons, 
Western Europe would be destroyed. The assumption that World 
War 111 would be fought without the use of nuclear weapons is 
refuted by the known plans of the NATO command. The idea 
that only "tactical" atomic weapons might be used has been 
dissected in a previous chapter. 
.2. What about the "plate glass window theory9'-the idea 
that we must keep at least some ground forces where they would 
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have to be overrun by the first Russian advance into Western 
Europe. 
Answer: If that theory has any validity in the atomic age, it 
would be perfectly possible to adapt it to the proposal here put 
forward. It could be agreed that the Western powers would 
keep a limited number of troops along the eastern frontier of 
the neutralized belt while the Russians would maintain a similar 
contingent along its western border. A similar idea applied only 
to radar screens was suggested by a French general in 1954. 
Better still, two United Nations task forces could take over 
the plate glass window function. 
TOWARD RED CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
If there is to be a common Western policy in dealing with 
the two great communist dictatorships, the United States will have 
to make some major concessions unpalatable to a great many 
Americans. This is especially true with respect to the Chinese 
People's Republic. 
Among the Western nations, the United States stands alone 
in its refusal to accept the fact that the Peking regime is 
established as the effective government of a nation containing 
almost onequarter of the world's population. The United States 
stands alone in supporting the Chinese Nationalists' hope of return- 
ing to power, though not in supporting the legitimacy of National- 
ist rule over Taiwan (Formosa). The United States finds itself more 
and more isolated in its diplomatic and economic boycott of the 
Chinese People's Republic and in its determination to deny the 
Peking government admission to the United Nations. Finally, 
the deliberately ambiguous attitude of the American government 
toward the rightful ownership and defense of the Chinese off-shore 
islands has kept the United States at the brink of a war with 
the Chinese People's Republic-a war which might well endanger 
the security of the entire world. 
There are obvious reasons why American hostility toward the 
Chinese Communists is greater than that of the other Western 
nations. Only the United States became involved in the Chinese 
civil war and, hence, entangled in an alliance with the Nationalists 
after their defeat. The United States bore the brunt of the 
fighting in Korea and suffered the greatest number of casualties 
at Chinese hands. 
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The fact remains, however, that the resulting position of the 
United States with respect to China has become unrealistic, unten- 
able and a road-block to Western solidarity, as well as an obstacle 
to the achievement of any reasonable settlement of outstanding 
issues in the Far East. Moreover, in this writer's opinion, more 
fully expressed elsewhere,* present American policy with respect 
to China is self-defeating and contrary to the best interests of 
the American people. 
(The United States is also increasingly isolated from the 
other Western nations by its present attitude toward India and 
Japan, but the formation of a common Western policy toward 
these two crucially important Asian nations can be more appro- 
priately discussed under the heading of Western policy toward 
the unaligned nations.) 
While, with respect to Communist China, it is our dexibility 
that stands in the way of Western unity, it is our contrasting indeci- 
sion that confuses our allies and obstructs the formation of a 
common policy toward the Soviet Union. This indecision is 
natural enough but nonetheless dangerous. No one really knows 
what has been happening in Russia since the death of Josef Stalin. 
Even less can anyone foretell future developments. 
The reaffirmation by Nikita Khrushchev of the belief in the 
eventual triumph of communism means no more than did the 
declaration by Moslem leaders, centuries ago, that Islam would 
conquer the world. When Islam and Christianity eventually 
reached a stalemate, the Moslem and the Christian dreams of 
supremacy were each forgotten. So it was with Napoleon's dream 
and Hitler's vision of a "thousand year Reich". And so it will 
probably be with all dreams of world conquest so long as there 
remains a world to conquer. 
What matters is not whether the Russians have changed their 
ultimate objective but whether and, if so, why they have changed 
their methods of approaching that objective. On this question 
there have been within the American government two conflicting 
interpretations. It is obvious to all that the Russians have changed 
their tactics. The disagreement is over the question of what has 
caused them to do so. 
There is the view, at various times publicly expressed with 
smug satisfaction by Secretary of State Dulles, that the recent 
developments within Russia are a sign of weakness; that this 
weakness is due to the "success" of Western policy; and that, 
* Turning Point Toward Peace, Chapter 12. 
therefore, Western policy--especially the policy of the United 
States-should remain essentially unchanged. But there is also 
the contrary view, widely held abroad and also in some Washing- 
ton circles, that Russia has made enormous strides in building 
up her military and economic power; that the "smiling diplomacy" 
of Bulganin and Khrushchev derives from a sense of strength and 
a certainty of ultimate triumph; and that Russia is infinitely 
more dangerous today than in the time of Stalin. This is what 
Mr. Dulles has been saying on those occasions when he was 
seeking Congressional appropriations; but, even in this less boastful 
mood, Mr. Dulles has maintained that our present policy should 
be continued. 
Other men close to President Eisenhower have, on the other 
hand, appeared to hold the belief that our policy should be changed 
so as to encourage more negotiation, more cooperation and more 
trade with the communist orbit. Uncertainty as to the nature of 
the American defense forces to be maintained has added to the 
confusion. 
The whole dilemma has been aggravated by the illness of 
President Eisenhower and the incidence of national elections. The 
President's inability to give firm and continuous leadership has 
been largely responsible for the stagnation of American policy, 
while the approach of elections caused what amounted to a tacit 
agreement on the part of lesser politicians to pigeon-hole all con- 
troversial and emotion-charged issues. 
It is only fair to say that the divergent opinions of other 
Western governments added to Washington's confusion. In June 
1956, Chancellor Adenauer came to this country to plead earnestly 
for the continuation of a tough, wholly distrustful and uncompro- 
mising policy. Like Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, the 
German Chancellor had so committed himself to the cold war that 
he could see no possible alternative. Within a week, the French 
foreign minister, Christian Pineau, arrived with a briefcase full of 
arguments for a more conciliatory policy; Sir Anthony Eden 
expressed similar sentiments in the British House of Commons, 
holding that the time had come to explore carefully whether or not 
the spectacular repudiation of Stalin had opened the door to better 
relations with the Soviet government. 
DXEcult as it may be for the Western leaders to reach firm 
conclusions, the fact remains that nothing could be more danger- ,. 
ous to the West than the absence of a common policy toward each 
of the two hostile communist dictatorships. 
It is equally clear that Russia and Red China present two 
wholly different problems. Russia has reached an advanced stage 
of industrial development and is consolidating rather than advanc- 
ing her social revolution. China is in the early stages of industriali- 
zation and revolutionary change. Chinese and Russian interests 
are by no means identical, nor are the causes of their hostility to 
the West the same. Russia is essentially a competitor of the West. 
China is a rebel against Western interference in her internal affairs 
and an insurgent against white supremacy and non-Asian influence. 
In dealing with Peking, the Western problem is, first of all, 
to establish channels of negotiation and then to use them in settling 
the outstanding differences over the offshore islands, Taiwan, 
Korea and China's future relation to southeast Asia. If these 
matters can be disposed of, there should remain very little conflict 
of interest between China and the West. It is by no means fantastic 
to expect that, in time, Western cooperation with China's develop 
ment will be more natural and more mutually beneficial than 
Sino-Soviet cooperation. 
In dealing with Moscow, the Western problem consists of 
using already established channels of communication to convert 
explosively hostile competition into a safer and more constructive 
form of rivalry. The over-riding objective must be the achieve- 
ment of disarmament. First steps in that direction might well be 
the banning of nuclear tests and experiments with the intercon- 
tinental missile, the achievement of a German settlement and the 
creation of a neutral belt across Europe, along the lines already 
suggested. 
III. TOWARD THE UNALIGNED NATIONS 
Western policy toward the uncommitted nations, which hold 
the ultimate balance of power, is probably of greater long-run 
importance than Western policy toward Moscow and Peking. 
Until quite recently, the United States has been more and more 
isolated from other Western nations by its harsh and uncompro- 
mising attitude, often expressed in the phrase: "If they're not with 
us, they're against us." This somewhat primitive feeling has been 
shared by few of the other Western governments. 
During the summer of 1956, especially after the visit to 
Washington of Indonesia's President Sukarno, the Americaxi policy- 
making group went through an apparently "agonizing" though 
incomplete re-examination of this attitude. The second illness of 
President Eisenhower and the consequent postponement of Indian 
Prime Minister Nehru's scheduled visit, cut short deliberations 
which might have resulted in a fruitful re-definition of policy by 
the chief executive. As it was, the President made a preliminary 
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statement during one of his press conferences, indicating both 
understanding and sympathy for the attitude of the so-called 
neutralist nations of Asia. The President recalled that the United 
States itself had, during its early years of independence, pursued 
a policy of neutrality and expressed understanding for the fact that 
participation in military alliances involved a certain amount of 
danger. 
This statement caused a furor among the advocates of intran- 
sigence. The ambassador of Pakistan called at the State Depart- 
ment to ask for an explanation. Chancellor Adenauer instituted 
similar enquiries. The White House secretariat came forward with 
a somewhat ambiguous supplementary statement. It remained for 
Secretary Ddes  to jerk the rudder back completely from the new 
course set by the President. In a carefully prepared speech 
delivered at Iowa State University on June 9, the Secretary 
declared that neutrality was obsolete and that "except in excep- 
tional cases it is an immoral and short-sighted conception". 
Now the clamor arose in New Delhi, Rangoon and Jakarta. 
As usual, whenever President Eisenhower's impromptu utterances 
revealed the essential fairness of his conceptions, his natural trust 
in human decency and his deep desire for peace, his Secretary of 
State managed to convey the opposite impression. The picture 
given to the world has been one of an administration divided 
within itself, with the President representing the liberal wing of 
both the Republican and Democratic parties and his Secretary of 
State acting as the spokesman of the ultra-nationalist intransigents. 
(Actually, John Foster Dulles is far from being an ultra-nationalist, 
but his concern, as Secretary of State, has unfortunately been more 
with domestic politics than with statesmanship.) 
The absence of a common Western policy with respect to the 
unaligned nations has played directly into the hands of the Kremlin. 
It has enabled the Soviet leaders to woo the uncommitted peoples 
by speaking constantly of the "peace bloc of the socialist coun- 
tries" as opposed to the "war bloc which the United States is seek- 
ing to expand by drawing nation after nation into military 
alliances". This has been particularly effective in Asia. 
The effect of the American initiative in organizing the South- 
east Asian counterpart to NATO-the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) -has been especially disastrous. By 
re-arming Pakistan and drawing it into military alliance with the 
Western powers, the United States not only alienated India, Burma 
and Ceylon but upset the balance of power as between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan as well as the balance between Pakistan and India. 
Instead of creating a cordon of military strength against the expan- 
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sion of the communist orbit, SEATO-by alienating Afghanistan- 
has opened to the Soviet Union the door to the Khyber Pass; and 
r%y alienating India, Burma and Ceylon, SEAT0 has made these 
countries susceptible to communist propaganda, backed by offers 
of economic aid. 
One of the top items on any agenda for formulating a, com- 
mon Western policy in Asia 'should be the replacement of this 
self-defeating military alliance by an enlarged and invigorated 
Colombo Plan, or by a new regional organization designed solely 
to promote economic development. 
The key to the Asian future lies in India. I suspect that the 
key to a safer and more tolerable coexistence between the rival 
power blocs also lies in the use of India as a mediator. 
Japan, too, is of great importance to the Asian future. Here 
again, an American policy, concerning which the other Western 
powers entertain grave misgivings, obstructs progress toward West- 
em unity. Japan wants to be a friend of the West, but Japan lives 
and must live in and with Asia. American insistence upon Japanese 
rearmament, American occupation (for air bases) of badly needed 
Japanese farm land, American-imposed restrictions on trading with 
China, and American disregard of Japanese pleas to discontinue 
testing nuclear weapons are rapidly alienating Japanese sentiment. * 
So far as Asia is concerned, the problem of formulating and 
putting in& effect a common Western policy consists very largely 
in changing existing American policy. This is not to say that 
Britain, France, Holland and Portugal have not made their share 
of mistakes in Asia, but these mistakes have had to do chiefly with 
liquidating the colonial past, whereas the American mistakes in 
Asia have had to do with misjudging the present and the future. 
IV. TOWARD THE EMERGING PEOPLES 
The problem of forming a common Western policy with 
respect to the peoples emerging or seeking to emerge into inde- 
pendence overlaps the problem of dealing with the uncommitted 
nations. Most of the nations which have recently gained their 
independence are uncommitted, and most of the peoples seeking 
national independence are likely to join the bloc of the unaligned. 
Nevertheless, the two problems are not identical and, of the two, 
that posed by the struggle between the emerging peoples and the 
colonial powers is by far the most difficult to solve. 
* 30,000,000 Japanese signed a petition to the United States to abandon 
nuclear tests at Eniwetok. 
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Having led the way in breaking free from European colonial 
domination and having set the example of liberating the Philippines, 
the United States should by rights have been the one great Western 
nation capable of moderating both the hyperfervid haste of some 
of the dependent peoples and the stubborn retentiveness of some 
of the colonial powers. Far from playing a constructive part in 
this coac t ,  the United States has actually sharpened it by inject- 
ing into it the almost wholly extraneous American obsession with 
the cold war against communism. 
When it comes to denouncing neutralism as "immoral and 
short-sighted", Secretary Ddles should realize that the nation for 
which he speaks is living in a glass house. Neutralism is precisely 
what the American government has practiced with respect to a 
conflict no less important than the struggle between the communist 
dictatorships and the anti-communist coalition. 
If ever there was a clearly predictable disaster, it is that which 
has overtaken the French in North Africa. Yet, so great was the 
American government's preoccupation with preserving its com- 
munistencircling bases that even the tragic lesson of IndoChina 
failed to drive home the futility of backing French efforts to sup- 
press colonial revolt by force. Had the United States brought to 
bear upon France only a fraction of the pressure which it exerted 
in behalf of accepting German rearmament, it might have per- 
suaded the French to mobify their North African policy in time 
to avert a second disaster. 
The same sort of wavering neutralism has characterized our 
government's attitude toward the Arab revolt against British over- 
lordship in the Middle East. First, in 1953, Secretary Dulles 
adopted a pro-Arab policy. Then having urged the British to 
evacuate Suez, Secretary DulIes sponsored the one idea predictably 
certain to make Egypt hostile to the West in spite of British with- 
drawal; namely, the notion-born of cold war considerations- 
to link Iraq, Egypt's rival for Arab leadership, into an alliance 
with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The arming of Iraq led 
Egypt to seek arms from Russia and this, in turn, brought Russia 
' into the Middle East and Egypt and Israel to the brink of war. 
Having fathered the ill-fated Baghdad Pact, Mr. Dulles could think 
of nothing better than to stand aloof from its fatal consequences. 
Throughout the ensuing period of many-sided tension, the Ameri- 
can State Department tried to be friends with everyone and suc- 
ceeded only in antagonizing the British, the French, the Israelis, 
the Arabs and, finally, the Egyptians. 
The crisis over the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal was 
the direct result of Secretary Dulles' wavering Middle East policy. 
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When the fiasco of the Baghdad Pact resulted in Egypt's turning 
to Russia for arms, Mr. Dulles made frantic efforts to forestall 
further Soviet penetration by hastening American aid to Egypt in 
building the Aswan high dam. Yet, when it became apparent 
that the Kremlin was in no hurry to outbid the United States in 
financing the Aswan project, Mr. Dulles suddenly reversed his 
policy and abruptly withdrew the American offer, justifying his 
action by a statement which would have offended even a less sensi- 
tive government than that of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. It 
was scarcely surprising that the hot-headed, ambitious and ruthless 
Egyptian leader should react by seizing and nationalizing the Suez 
Canal. 
Nor was it surprising that the British and French governments 
should, for the moment, lose their heads over the Egyptian seizure 
and unwisely threaten military action. French resentment against 
Nasser was at fever pitch because of his backing the Arab revolt 
in North Africa. British resentment was aroused less by the act 
of nationalizing the Canal than by the possibility that the Egyptian 
dictator might some day close the vital waterway in spite of his 
assurances to the contrary. The British demand for international - 
control was explicitly based upon distrust of Nasser. 
The weakness of the Western position, however, was that the 
Western powers had for over a year winked at Nasser's refusal to 
pennit Israeli ships to use the waterway, and that they themselves 
had in time of war closed the Canal to enemy vessels although the 
treaty of 1888 expressly provided that it should be open to ships 
of all nations "in time of war as well as in time of peace." 
When the crisis broke out in August, 1956, American efforts 
were sensibly directed toward peaceful settlement; but, instead of 
bringing the matter before the United Nations, the Western powers 
attempted to settle the matter by a conference of 24 somewhat 
curiously selected "interested nations." Out of consideration for 
Egyptian sensibilities, Israel-a very vitally interested nation- 
was not invited to attend. At the same time, British military 
preparations against Egypt went on in the full glare of publicity. 
As might be expected, Egypt refused to attend and made it clear 
that, while she might agree to some form of international consulta- 
tion concerning the operation of the Suez Canal, she would not be 
coerced into accepting international control inconsistent with her 
sovereignty. Thus the West seemed headed for another major 
defeat. 
Granted that there never was any easy solution to the problems 
of the Middle East and that even a wiser Western policy might 
not have been w M y  successful, it surely must be apparent that 
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it was a fatal mistake to rearm the Arab states and to attempt 
the formation of a Northern Tier Alliance. This is not hindsight 
on my part. A year ago,* I made these two observations: 
Arming an area against a danger which 
threatens it can be effective only if its inhabitants 
recognize that the danger exists and wish to defend 
themselves against it. With the exception of the 
Turks, who have a long tradition of hostility toward 
Russia and an active desire to defend themselves 
against Soviet aggression, most of the peoples of 
the Moslem crescent are more concerned with 
shaking off the remnants of European colonialism 
than with fending off possible communist encroach- 
ment. . . . They are more conscious of American 
bomber bases and British military installations on 
their soil than of the Red Army lurking behind the 
mountains of the Caucasus. 
A second consideration is that arming nations 
which have outstanding disputes with their neighbors 
--especially boundary disputes such as exist between 
India and Pakistan and, in more explosive form, 
between Israel and the Arab states-is more likely 
to lead to war than to peaceful settlements. 
Like SEAT0 in Asia, the Baghdad Pact is a source of trouble 
to be liquidated as quickly and as gracefully as possible. Like 
SEATO, it should be replaced by a regional organization for 
economic development. 
The formation of a common Western policy aiming at the 
gradual emancipation of all the dependent peoples requires more 
than hand-wringing abstention or wavering intervention on the 
part of the United States. So far, Britain, the greatest but also 
the wisest of the colonial powers, has made a greater contribu- 
tion than the United States to the solution of the colonial problem. 
Not that Britain has solved all its difficulties, but Britain has 
shown the world how an empire could be turned into a common- 
wealth of free nations and how its colonies could peacefully 
emerge either into voluntary membership in that commonwealth 
or into complete national independence. Yet even Britain faces 
problems which cannot be solved by any ghb formula, as witness 
Cyprus, Malta and Singapore. Nor can Britain afford to deal 
with the nationalist revolt in the oil-rich countries of the Middle 
East without considering her own precarious financial position. 
* Turning Point Toward Peace, page 54. 
As for France, whatever one may think of past French 
colonial policy,* it is a fact that France is now confronted with 
an almost insoluble problem in Algeria, where over one million 
Frenchmen have settled, many of them several generations ago. 
The worldwide nationalist revolt of the dependent peoples 
has created a situation which demands the understanding help 
of not only the United States but of all the non-colonial nations. 
This is where the Latin American republics could, if consulted, 
be of great assistance. Most of the Latin American peoples, 
while long since freed from colonial mle, nevertheless share 
many of the Afro-Asian resentments and aspirations. They, too, 
have been left behind by the technological revolution. They, 
too, have been relegated to the role of second-class world citizens. 
At the same time, their own experience tells them that the mere 
attainment of national independence does not necessarily bring 
with it equal status or equal opportunity for advancement. As full 
and equal partners of the West, they could be the ideal mediators. 
* My own views of French colonial policy, together with a prediction of 
the trouble which has since developed, were stated in Turning Point Toward 
Peace, Chapter 7 .  
CONCLUSION. 
I. THE PLACE TO BEGIN IS HERE AT HOME 
The heavy emphasis placed upon American shortcomings 
throughout the preceding discussion may well engender a certain 
amount of resentment. The reader may be prompted to ask: 
"Are we the only sinners? What about some of the other mem- 
bers of the Western commanity? And, above all, who produced 
this crisis in world affairs?-Certainly not the United States". 
Among the nations of the West, we are by no means the 
only sinners, especially if one views the actions of the West 
not just in the light of the present but in the perspective of, let 
us say, the last half century. World War I was bred in Europe 
and so were both communism and fascism. World War I1 was 
bred by the entire Western community, plus Japan. Since World 
War 11, the European nations have made their share of mistakes, 
but the difference between their postwar mistakes and ours, as 
I see it, is that theirs have been mistakes of unfamiliar and unex- 
pected weakness while ours have been mistakes of unaccustomed 
strength and unfamiliar responsibility. 
As for "who caused the crisis in world affairs", it is true 
that the communist dictatorships have done more than their 
share, but by way of ruthlessly exploiting the crisis rather than 
by contributing to its original causes. The communist dictator- 
ships did not create the global revolution against poverty, nor 
the Asian and Middle Eastern revolt against colonialism, nor did 
they invent the weapons of race suicide. The communist dicta- 
torships have fished in the troubled waters roiled up by two 
great wars and the premature dawn of an age for which man- 
kind was not ready. They have made the crisis infinitely more 
dangerous and infinitely more difficult to solve than it would 
have been, had it not been complicated by their brutal pursuit 
of their own selfish ends. But, if the conlmunist dictatorships were 
tomorrow to be overthrown, the basic elements of the crisis would 
still be with us; we might have a little more time to meet its 
problems, but we could not escape from meeting them. 
The United States alone cannot, of course, save the world 
from an atomic holocaust nor-if humanity escapes from that 
disaster---can the United States alone assure the survival of 
Western civilization. But the point of this study is precisely 
to show how great is the burden of unsought responsibility that 
rests upon the American people and how much depends upon 
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what the United States does or fails to do in the months and 
years ahead. 
Without our moral leadership, there can be no de-fusing of 
the fearful weapons of mass murder which we have invented-no 
firm establishment of lasting peace through the abolition of national 
armaments. 
Without our great economic strength, developed to its full 
potential, the West will be powerless to prevent an almost world- 
wide dependence upon corntnunist aid for economic development. 
Unless we modify many of our fixed ideas and frozen attitudes, 
we shall be unable to supply moral leadership and our economic 
strength will remain a latent and sterile asset. 
The place to begin is here at home. Inevitably, our foreign 
policy will reflect the "state of the Union" within our own 
borders and the state of mind of the American people. 
The "state of the Union" is, as I have tried to show, far 
from being as strong and healthy as most of us seem to believe. 
The state of mind of the American people is dangerously com- 
placent and materialistic. 
We cannot pursue an intelligent course of diplomacy, so long 
as our statesmen remain obsessed by obsolete concepts of no longer 
existent physical power, nor so long as our political leadership 
lacks either the vision to see the true state of &airs or the courage 
to tell the truth to the American people. 
We cannot be the champions of freedom abroad, so long as 
we continue to suppress freedom here at home or to deny its full 
enjoyment to any part of our own population. 
We cannot become intelligently liberal in our dealings with 
other peoples, so long as we remain foolishly "conservative" in 
meeting the economic and social needs of our own people. The 
kind of "conservatism" which governs our national fiscal policy 
does not conserve our nation's strength; it permits our assets to 
waste away. Our children's and our grandchildren's future is being 
impaired by lack of schoolrooms and teachers. Our land is being 
eroded by drought and washed away by floods into the sea. Our 
natural resources are being developed more for private profit than 
for public good. This is not conservatism. It is irresponsible 
waste, dictated by self-interest pressure groups and rationalized by 
the book-keeping concepts of a bygone era. 
There is a strange contradiction between our fiscal behavior 
as a nation and our behavior as a people. Except for military 
expenditures, our government regulates its budget on the parsi- 
monious principles of a Puritan spinster. The aggregate of indi- 
vidual American household budgets, on the other hand, would 
show little evidence of self-reliant thrift and responsibility. 
It seems to me that what we must do is to reverse these empha- 
ses: to be less "conse~ative" in our national fiscal policy and more 
truly conservative in our individual balancing of expenditure 
against income. At the same time, we must place enough restraint 
upon our free enterprise capitalism to prevent it from wasting its 
own strength. 
This is no plea for wild public extravagance, nor for extreme 
private austerity, nor for undue government interference with busi- 
ness. In the private sector of our economic life, it is a plea for 
nothing more than the application of common sense. In the sector 
of public policy, it is a plea for just enough government expendi- 
ture and governmental action to take care of the nation's most 
obviously neglected needs, to clean out the pockets of depression 
in our "prosperous" economy, to free our economy from depend- 
ence upon military expenditure, to stimulate more rapid growth 
and adjustment-in other words, to transform the United States 
from a complacent, status quo nation into a dynamic element in a 
rapidly changing world. 
As a status quo nation, incapable as we now are of using 
physical force to prevent change, we are doomed to defeat by the 
revolutionary forces at work in the world. Our only chance for 
future greatness-if not our only chance for survival-lies in 
becoming once more, as we have been in the past, a leader of 
revolutionary change. To accomplish this requires no departure 
from the American tradition. It requires nothing more than the 
resumption of our natural role-the role which has, in the past, 
made us a great nation because we have attracted the allegiance 
of al l  men everywhere seeking change for the better. 
II. THE PREDICAMENT OF WESTERN MAN 
The revitalization of the American spirit is of crucial impor- 
tance, but the challenge we face must atso be seen in a broader 
context. We are only a part of that segment of the human race 
which, for want of a better term, is commonly referred to as 
"Western Man." 
By this term we mean that minority of the human family 
which first spread from the Mediterranean Basin over most of 
Europe mil then settled the two Americas and the antipodes, 
establishing in these widely separated regions of the earth some- 
thing of o common culture and civilization. It is this part of the 
human race which has for several centuries dominated the course 
Sixty-one 
of world affairs and which now stands on trial before the aroused 
masses of mankind. 
Western Man acquired ascendancy chiefly because he devel- 
oped and maintained a lead over the majority of mankind in 
military and economic power. He has ruled because he first 
emancipated himself from the shackles of a primitive agricultural 
society, discovered the division of labor, learned how to manu- 
facture, to trade, to accumulate capital and to achieve mobility 
over land and sea. Thus he was able to acquire more and more 
relative strength, knowledge and freedom. Thus he might have 
been able to gain the respect and admiration of all mankind and 
to establish a leadership based upon consent. 
The fatal weaknesses of Western Man have been his insatiable 
acquisitiveness and his inability to live at peace with himself. The 
component parts of Western society did not unite in order to rule 
the world in peace and justice. They quarreled endlessly over 
their religious beliefs, their possessions and their opportunities for 
self aggrandizement. They fought over the hegemony of Europe, 
over the ownership and exploitation of newly discovered parts of 
the world and, finally, over the domination of the world itself. 
In the end, Western Man has a l l  but destroyed the most 
important foundations of his own ascendancy. Insofar as his 
supremacy rested upon force of arms, he has developed the means 
of destruction to the point at which armed force has become 
meaningless. To the extent that his power was economic, he has 
undermined it through endless fratricidal wars. Where his advan- 
tage derived fiom technological skill and knowledge not possessed 
by others, his own inventions have eliminated time and distance 
to such an extent that the maintenance of his monopoly became 
impossible. Where he might have gained the respect and admira- 
tion of the less privileged majority of the human race, Western 
Man has undermined his own prestige and influence by failing to 
practice the principles which he preached or to live up to the 
religions which he so ardently proselytized. 
The present grave predicament of Western Man consists in 
having to learn, and learn quickly, how to live in and with a world 
which has forever escaped from his control. It consists in ha* 
to learn, and learn quickly, how to survive in a world released 
from ignorance and the coercion of that physical power by means 
of which the underprivileged majority of the human race has 
hitherto been restrained from seeking justice and equality. 
If Western Man fails to come to terms with a world no longer 
under his control, he is certain to be submerged by the global 
revolution. If he succeeds, he may perhaps enter upon a new 
phase in his long pilgrimage in which he will at long last discover 
the secret of leadership by example and consent. 
But that is not all. The crisis of Western Man is not merely 
the crisis of waning power. It is also a moral crisis. 
Western Man stands on trial before his own conscience and 
before the conscience of mankind because he, more than his fellow 
men, has violated the precept that it is wrong for man to kill except 
in self-defense; Western Man has stretched the concept of self- 
defense to the point of legitimizing the mass murder of wholly 
innocent civilian populations. Most of the world's peoples have 
at one time or another been guilty of armed aggression and of 
cruelty in war, but it remained for Western Man to invent long- 
range artillery and to use it in the bombardment of open cities; 
to invent the airplane and, from it, to drop high explosive or 
incendiary bombs upon sleeping men, women and children; and, 
finally, to create the inhuman instruments of race suicide. 
Not once, since the birth of Christ, has Western Man pro- 
duced a Gandhi. Western Man has spawned Torquemadas, 
Napoleons, Hitlers and Statins. He has preached love and prac- 
ticed hate. 
Western civilization stands or falls upon the belief in the 
dignity of man, in the equality of all men before God, and in the 
equal rights of all men to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happi- 
ness." 
What dignity, what equality, what hope of life, liberty and 
happiness can exist anywhere on this earth, until the destructive 
forces released by Western Man are brought under moral as well 
as physical control? 
Western Man is standing upon the topmost rung of a shaky 
ladder from which he is reaching for the very throne of God. If 
he falls, the innocent masses of mankind will be destroyed in his 
self-destrzlction. But if, at the last moment, Western Man saves 
himself and the world from extinction, he will not only have to 
learn how to adjust himself to radically altered circumstance; he 
will also have to learn a new humility. 
This, then, is the crisis of Western Man. In the Chinese 
language, which is far older than our own, there is no word for 
crisis. It is written with two characters, one meaning danger and 
the other opportunity. That is what we face: Deadly danger and 
almost unimaginable opportunity. 
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Over 100,000 copies have been distributed by educational, civic, 
religibus, farm and labor organizations. 
More than 20,000 dopies have been'sent out by members of 
Congress to their constituents. 
Here is what a member .of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee said on the floor of the Senate when he asked znd obtained 
un-ous consent to have the entire text of Turning Point Toward 
Peace included in the Congressional Record of April 16, 1956: 
The leadership which Mr. Warburg is giving to a thorough 
appraisal of American fore@ policy shows very clearly 
that, irrespective of what the politicians do by way of 
debating or not debating all phases of our foreign policy, 
there is rising among our citizenry a tidal wave-of &cus- 
sion and debate. 
One' of the outstanding leaders of this public discussion is 
James Warburg of New York. He is recognized as a. keen 
scholar of foreign affairs, a highly .respected economic con- 
servative, and a very inteagent and patriotic critic of some 
of the trends in American foreign pofiby. I ~ glad that 
we have James Warburgs in America and , A .  I hope that their 
numbers will' increase. 
If you have not yet read TURNING POINT TOWARD 
PEACE, order your copy now. It will help you to grasp the full 
signiiicance of its sequel, DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY. 
(Price: 50 cents.) 
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